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Seoul National University 
 
This study focused on the regional development and consisted of three 
essays. The first thesis analyzed the effect of labor or population mobility 
between the two regions on regional economies employing a simple two-
region model. As a result of comparative analysis, for the success of Sejong 
City, the residential and work sites need to be reconciled without having to 
commute to the SMA region. Finally, the key issue is the policy of migration 
to Sejong City for a short period of time, which needs to involve subsidies or 
incentives. Consequently, economic activities should be relocated in the target 
region. Numerical simulation showed that high transportation and commuting 
costs induce labor and population dispersion to the Choungchong region, 
including Sejong City, and positively affect the output growth. However, 
social welfare also decreases. Therefore, subsidies and tax policies are needed 
to achieve labor and population dispersion in the Choungchong region, 
including Sejong City, without a decrease in welfare.  
The second paper is to analyze economic growth patterns of high and low 
income regions during economic recession and recovery periods using 
asymmetric income growth model with neighboring effects. This paper also 
attempts to identify economic causes for the stagnant underdevelopment of 
the less developed region. The quantitative results found that there have been 
the less developed regions which recorded a low average regional income 
levels from 1998 to 2009 and even lower regional income growth rates in 
2009 against 1998 compared with the national average, moreover grew less 
during the recovery periods compared with the developed regions. This 
structural factor caused the low income growth among less developed regions. 
In addition, the neighboring developed regions pulled most of the regional 
income growth of the less developed regions. Finally, capital enlargement, 
reinforcement of the manufacturing basis, and a more active role in of 
regional government, including the optimal regional tax burden, were needed 
to facilitate regional income growth in the less developed regions. These 
results imply that urban integration would be needed not between the 
ii 
developed regions and the adjacent developed regions but between less 
developed regions and its neighboring developed regions. Moreover, the 
empirical results of concentration in manufacturing sector suggest that the 
relocation of manufacturing facilities among regions may be required. 
The third study analyzed the factors of output growth of firms in financial 
sectors considering the role of local government in regional government 
policies. This study employed multi-level statistical models using firm-level 
data. Firms in ROK are inferior in financing through the direct financial 
market (market-based financial system). Moreover, firms in ROK regions are 
inferior in the financial credit assistance of local governments to firms in 
SMA, which can cause them financial constraints. The relationship between 
the market-based system and the bank-based system must be mutually 
complementary even though the direct financing market more significantly 
affects the output growth of firms. Also, financial tools and fiscal policies as 
local government policies positively and differently activate the output growth 
of firms per region at the macro level. This result continues to promote the 
regional deviation of output growth of firms. Finally, the local government 
should establish a vigorous fiscal policy on economic activities and financing 
assistance for firms. The local government credit guarantee program must also 
be revised more efficiently to contribute to the financing and the output 
growth of firms. Also, financial tools and fiscal policies should be more 
diversified in ROK regions. Lastly, the regional financial policy of the local 
government must be revised in the direction more suitable to the output 
growth of firms through the participation in the direct financial system such as 
bond issues and paid-in-capital increase.  
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Chapter I  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Purpose  
 
Regional development and policy are major issues in regional economics. 
These issues stem from disparities among regions, especially in terms of 
income. Regional economic growth has been studied, and the effect of 
regional policy measures has been evaluated to reduce regional disparities. 
These disparities are a result of different economic activities and resources, 
industrial structures and development, and infrastructures. In expediting the 
implementation of free trade and liberalization of capital movement among 
nations and regions, regional integration and external forces are considered 
important. These progressed to the study of spatiality, to which economic 
outcome and resources (such as degree of development, knowledge spill-over, 
accessibility and connectivity through infrastructures within and between 
regions, and backward and forward linkages from labor and commodity 
markets) as well as economic and non-economic occurrences such as financial 
crisis and disaster would spread. 
Therefore, regional policies have been developed under the framework of 
(national) efficiency and (inter-regional) equity to reduce regional disparities. 
Regional policies are also collaboratively formulated in terms of various 
aspects. 
Armstrong (2002) stated that at least seven related theories of regional 
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growth have been created, and these theories affect the formulation of 
regional policies (Dijk et al., 2009). The first theory is neoclassical growth 
theory, which states that output growth is determined by the growth and the 
mobility of production factors and technology. Convergence of output among 
regions occurs as developing regions rapidly accumulate capital until they 
reach a situation of diminishing returns, which result in attractive and 
productive investments in less developed regions. The second theory is the 
endogenous growth model, which explicitly and endogenously includes 
technological progress that was not identified in neoclassical growth theory. 
Technological progress is a result of human capital, scale effects, spill-over 
from investments in physical capital, and research and development. The third 
theory is post-Fordism and radical theory, which can be achieved within a 
geographical concentration of small and medium-sized firms. Regions that 
achieve geographical concentration can prosper, whereas those that do not are 
left behind. The fourth theory is social capital theory, which emphasizes the 
effects of the social, cultural, and political influences of regional economic 
growth under the framework of neoclassical growth theory. The fifth theory is 
the new economic geography (NEG) model based on the study of Krugman 
(1991). Upon acquiring an advantage, a region attracts new firms and 
potential workers because of its ability to exploit economies of scale and to 
demonstrate variety. The agglomeration process can be driven by productivity 
effects from input–output linkages that are associated with transportation 
costs. Sixth, agglomeration advantages are also stressed in evolutionary 
economic geography, but the model is focused on the role of entrepreneurship 
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and innovation in the Schumpeterian sense in relation to cohesion in networks 
and in clusters. Finally, the demand-driven export competition model exhibits 
the essential mechanisms of export competitiveness in some regions. The 
concept of regional competitiveness originally came from the theory of 
comparative advantage in the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem, which explains 
regional patterns of production and export specialization. Increasing 
competitiveness is mostly based on Verdoon’s Law, which considers 
productivity growth as a function of output growth. 
From the above overview, regional economic growth can clearly be 
explained by a broad variety of relevant factors (Dijk et al., 2009). Under the 
efficiency–equity trade-off, regions become less developed because of low 
economic growth rates, outdated industrial structures, and high unemployment 
rates. With regard to regional policies, the unemployed people in less 
developed regions are obviously expected to move to prosperous areas (Dijk 
et al., 2009). However, two kinds of perspectives are present. The first 
perspective is the movement of jobs from regions with tight labor markets to 
regions with high unemployment rates. The second perspective is the creation 
of new jobs in regions with high unemployment rates. The first perspective is 
demonstrated by the migration of firms in the UK in the 1960s and 1970s and 
by the relocation of public sector jobs. Oosterhaven (1981) showed that this 
perspective became a very effective regional policy in the Netherlands. 
Marshall et al. (2005) identified the positive effects of public sector dispersal 
in Great Britain. Specifically, the relocation of economic activities made 
target regions attractive and allowed central government subsidies or 
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incentives for economic activities to be considered. The second perspective is 
to support starting firms, provide export and innovation appropriation for 
small regional firms, create social networks among firms, stimulate spin-offs 
of universities and technological institutes, and provide office spaces with 
common facilities (Dijk et al., 2009). 
Therefore, this study focuses on regional development. Using a simple two-
region model with agglomeration economies, this study analyzes the effect of 
labor or population mobility on regional economies with mobility costs. The 
model identifies regional policy directions toward regional development, 
which include the relocation of economic activities. This study identifies less 
developed regions in Korea and investigates why they continue to show 
backward development and how their status can change with neoclassical 
growth theory. The regional policy implication is also discussed to expound 
on the regional income growth of less developed regions. Finally, this study 
examines the regional income growth and development of firms as a result of 
understanding the role of entrepreneurship and innovation in the 
Schumpeterian sense. Therefore, this study analyzes the factors in the output 
growth of firms, including financial sectors and regional government policies, 
by using the endogenous growth model. The study additionally explores how 
various financial resources contribute to the output growth of firms through 
productive channels. The important role of financial sectors in regional 
income growth, as the supplier of capital, is worthy of debate. Finally, this 
study states policy implications that are aimed to improve the efficiency of 
financial sectors and the output growth of firms.  
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1.2 Organization  
 
This paper consists of five chapters, as shown in Figure 1. Chapter I 
describes the background and the purpose of the study. Chapter II illustrates a 
simple two-region model and discusses the effect of labor or population 
mobility between regional economies. Chapter III presents the less developed 
regions, analyzes the asymmetric regional income growth model, and studies 
the neighboring effect of regional income growth in less developed regions. 
Chapter IV presents multi-level statistical models that involve financial 
sectors. It also analyzes the determinants of the output growth of firms and the 
effect of financial tools and fiscal policies as regional government policies. 
Finally, Chapter V summarizes previous results and synthesizes the policy 
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Migration and Regional Economic Growth  
Using a Simple Two-Regions Model 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The construction of Sejong City in Korea caused considerable controversy, 
with the proposal of the former government on either balanced regional 
growth or balanced national development. The key objective of the 
construction of Sejong City was to transfer residential places in Seoul 
Metropolitan Areas
1
 (SMA) to the Chungchong Area, which was 
approximately 160 km south of Seoul. Officials at the ministries were 
assigned, and employment was created. Furthermore, the purpose of the 
construction of Sejong City was to achieve balanced regional growth and 
national development, as well as to solve the problems caused by extreme 
concentration and overcrowding in SMA. With regard to the construction of 
Sejong City, Jun and Hur (2003) projected that the population in the 
Chungchong Area will increase by 0.48 or 1.56 million people, whereas a 
decrease will be observed in SMA by 0.38 or 1.22 million people. Korea Land 
Corporation (2004) predicted that 25,000 or 85,000 officials will migrate to 
Sejong City. However, three cases can alter these forecasts. First, if the job 
site will be moved to Sejong City, people will naturally migrate to the Sejong 
                                           
1 SMA includes Seoul, the capital of Korea, the Incheon region that is nearby Seoul, and the 
Kyounggi region that surrounds Seoul. 
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City. Second, although Sejong City is considered as a new job site, people 
may still reside in SMA. Third, people residing in Sejong City may opt to 
commute to SMA. Therefore, how will indirect utility depend on mobility, 
such as commuting or migration? How will transportation costs, which 
include logistics, commuting costs, or migration costs, affect indirect utilities? 
When will agglomeration economies emerge or improve? 
This study aims to analyze the effect of labor or population mobility 
between two regions on regional economies. The study seeks to identify how 
indirect utility can change according to four scenarios that consider mobility. 
These scenarios involve residence and work locations in the same region or in 
different regions. Cases of commuting and migration are considered as 
mobility modes. The study also aims to examine how transportation (logistics) 
costs during the trading of commodities and mobility costs, such as 
commuting and migration costs, can affect indirect utilities. Finally, the study 
investigates how indirect utilities can be affected by agglomeration. The paper 
is organized as follows. First, a literature review on mobility and 
agglomeration economies is presented. A simple two-region model is then 
developed. The results are analyzed through comparative analysis, and 
numerical simulation is performed with the use of transportation and 
commuting costs. Finally, concluding remarks and policy implications are 
presented. 
 
2.2 Migration, Transportation, and Mobility Costs 
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Mobility can be categorized into two types: migration and commuting. 
Transportation costs are logistically defined as the shipping (trade) costs of 
commodities, whereas mobility costs are the costs of commuting and 
migration of workers. Lower transportation costs, economies of scale, product 
differentiation, and positive general equilibrium feedback apparently work 
against the development of remote and sparsely populated suburb areas (Fujita 
et al., 1999). However, transportation and mobility costs are traditionally key 
factors that affect the relocation of economic activities and mobility, such as 
commuting or migration.  
Migration has initially been studied in various aspects, such as in terms of 
market-driven factors and public sector programs. For market-driven factors, 
Todaro (1969) emphasized that based on the market mechanism, a relatively 
higher permanent income attracts a steady stream of rural migrants into urban 
areas. Harris and Todaro (1970) considered migration as a response to urban–
rural differences in terms of expected earnings. Porell (1982) examined the 
effect of economic incentives and quality of life (QOL) on inter-metropolitan 
migration. QOL includes factors such as climate, park, sports events, crime, 
density, and local government expenditures that are exclusive of welfare 
payments. Cristopher and McMaster (1990) concluded that the market 
mechanism can remove regional inequality in economic prosperity. Inter-
regional migration was found to respond to changes in regional wages and to 
differences in employment opportunities. Migration that is induced by 
changes in unemployment rates restores the system to equilibrium. Cushing 
and Poot (2004) stressed that migration is a result of a forward-looking 
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behavior that maximizes an individual’s or household’s expected future 
benefits against cost. Gabszewicz and Tarola (2011) suggested the effect of 
wage differentials on migration between two countries. Kancs (2011) studied 
the determinants of migration, such as market potential, wages, and cost of 
living in European regions. For the non-market aspect, Tiebout (1956) 
suggested policies that promote residence mobility, and postulated that an 
increase in consumer–voter knowledge can improve the allocation of 
government expenditures. Meanwhile, mobility in acquiring jobs and 
knowledge relevant to the location of the industry and workers can improve 
the allocation of private resources. In the study of Cristopher and McMaster 
(1990), they determined the necessity of a regional policy that can move jobs 
to a depressed region to eliminate disequilibrium of the unemployment 
differential. Wilson (2003) examined the effect of an equal payment system 
on migration in Canada. Marshall et al. (2005) determined the positive effects 
of public sector dispersal in Great Britain. Mckinnish (2007) identified 
welfare migration effects based on the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children in the US. Glazer et al. (2008) analyzed the relationship of tax policy 
to income. This relationship can affect property values and induce migration. 
For the effect of transportation costs, such as shipping (trade) costs of 
commodities on economic activities, Weber (1909) pioneered that 
transportation costs are theoretically the most fundamental element that can 
determine location. Transportation costs are related to two fundamental 
aspects: material index and locational weight. Kilkenny (1998) studied the 
relationship between transportation costs and mobility and the rural 
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development of firms and workers. Changes in transportation costs can affect 
regional wage rates, thus determining the location of production cost-oriented 
firms and inducing spatial mobility of firms and workers. Finally, reduced 
transportation costs can result in the optimal number of firms and the 
concentration of firms in each region. Tabuchi (1998) demonstrated that when 
the transportation costs are low enough to overcome the advantages of 
agglomeration, dispersion prevails under equilibrium within a two-region 
framework. Tabuchi et al. (2005) also analyzed the effects of a decrease in 
inter-city transportation cost on the spatial distribution of the population in a 
multi-regional economy. An increase in the regional population can generate 
high urban costs. 
From the analysis on mobility costs, Suh (1988) defined conditions where 
inter-city commuting is plausible. In this study, workers lived in two strip 
cities that differ in distance from the central business districts. The cities also 
differ in their average prices for housing rents and commuting costs, with the 
absence of migration costs. Consequently, when the income gap is large 
enough relative to the distance between the two cities and to the amount of 
commuting costs, the residents of the low-income city tend to commute for 
work to the high-income city despite commuting costs. Pinto (2003) observed 
that if commuting or mobility costs are reduced, mobility is induced. Anas and 
Xiong (2003) explored high intra-city commuting costs and concluded that 
population growth favors diversification. Murata and Thisse (2005) examined 
the interplay between the transportation costs of commodities and the 
commuting costs of workers within a general equilibrium model, with the 
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assumption that workers can be mobile and can choose a region where they 
prefer to work and live. Low transportation costs facilitate the dispersion of 
economic activities, whereas low commuting costs foster the agglomeration of 
economic activities. Anas and Rhee (2007) indicated that toll fees as a 
commuting cost reduce inefficient suburb-to-city commuting, as demonstrated 
in a simple city-suburb model with cross-commuting. Baum-Snow (2007a, b) 
found that in metropolitan areas where the intra-highway system is more 
developed, the population is less concentrated at the center of the metropolitan 
city. Therefore, the degree of suburbanization is higher. Using a two-city 
model, Sorek (2009) studied how workers’ migration or commuting decisions 
depend on commuting or migration costs and on commuting time. 
Equilibrium migration is uni-directional, in which migrants become the most 
able workers in suburbs. Suburb workers exhibit moderate ability to commute 
to work in the metropolis and become the least able workers in suburbs. Sorek 
(2009) showed that a reduction in commuting time can moderate, stop, or 
reverse the migration process. As transport technology is developed, potential 
inter-city commuting time sharply declines. Therefore, commuting beyond the 
mono-centric framework or commuting between distant cities where workers 
can reside and work is made possible.  
In summary, four points are emphasized. First, migration is categorized 
according to a market mechanism and to public sector programs. Second, low 
transportation costs can induce concentration or dispersion of production 
factors, such as the mobility of workers. Third, high commuting costs can 
result in population dispersion in a multi-regional economy. Fourth, a low 
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commuting time caused by developed transportation technologies can results 
in population dispersion to suburban areas. 
 
2.3 Agglomeration in New Economic Geography 
 
Weber (1909) was the first to consider the concept of agglomeration 
economies in his analysis of an industrial location that is focused on 
manufacturing. In NEG, externalities are justified as agglomeration 
economies and involve a spatial aspect. Krugman (1991) suggested pecuniary 
externalities that are associated with demand or supply linkages in the 
location of firms and in the spatial mobility of workers. Krugman (1998) 
mentioned that producers tend to choose locations that are accessible to large 
markets and to the supplies of goods. Two linkage effects were identified. 
Locations with easy access to large markets are excellent for industries with 
large internal economies of scale (backward linkages). Large markets also 
favor the establishment of local suppliers of intermediate goods and hence the 
benefits of a supply chain (forward linkages). Krugman (1998) reported on the 
main forces that affect industrial concentration, as shown in Table 2.1. Parr 
(2002) also argued that the agglomeration economies enjoyed by a firm can be 
categorized into those based on spatially constrained internal economies and 
those based on spatially constrained external economies. This categorization 
refers to the fact that the unit cost of production is a decreasing function of the 
output. Parr (2002) categorized spatially constrained internal economies into 
three cases. The first case is horizontal integration, which means the 
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economies of scale are associated with the physical output. The second case is 
lateral integration, such as when a firm operates a plant that produces electric 
generators and pumping machinery. The third case is vertical integration, 
which is demonstrated by a firm that achieves cost savings by engaging in 
various stages and processes of production. Spatially constrained external 
economies are beyond the control of an individual firm and are typically 
caused by the presence and the collective action of other firms. As a result, the 
cost savings of an individual firm depend on the scale of the industry it 
belongs to, the existence of firms in other industries, the efficient flow of 
information, and the ability to coordinate the activities of the firm with other 
firms. Parr (2002) also strongly stressed that spatially constrained external 
economies may exist in a variety of spatial settings such as intra-urban spaces, 
regional level, and city-region or metropolis-based areas. 
 
Table 2.1 Main Categories of Forces Affecting Industrial Concentration 
Centripetal forces Centrifugal forces 
Market-size effects 
Thick labor markets 
Pure external economies 
Immobile factors of production 
Land rents 
Pure external diseconomies 
Source: Krugman (1998) 
 
The important factor of agglomeration economies in NEG is the 
transportation cost, which is the same as that in classical location theories. 
Decreasing transportation costs affect the movement of production factors, 
such as labor and changes in land rent and wage. If the land price becomes 
naturally higher, firms can start moving from core regions to nearby 
peripheral regions. With high land prices, expense rates also increase as 
15 
evident in high housing costs and high prices of non-traded goods and 
services in a large agglomeration. Meanwhile, transportation costs are further 








Figure 2.1 Impact of Decreasing Transportation Cost 
Source: Fujita (2007) 
 
Tabuchi (1998) illustrated the effect of reducing inter-city transportation 
costs on the patterns of agglomeration or dispersion among firms and workers 
in a two-region model. When transportation costs are low enough to overcome 
the advantages of agglomeration, dispersion expands under equilibrium. Wang 
and Wang (2010) reported that if the real wages are the same between two 
regions, agglomeration economies can disappear regardless of the amount of 
transportation costs. If a differential is observed on real wages, producers can 
agglomerate in a region with a high real wage. The relationship between 
agglomeration economies and transportation costs is not monotonous. The 
connection can be described as a reverse U curve, which represents the results 
from fragmentation to agglomeration and from agglomeration to 
fragmentation. The same trend was obtained by Fujita (2007). Alstadt et al. 
(2012) analyzed the relationship of transportation access and connectivity to 




Transportation cost (T) 
Immobile Dispersion 
due to lower 
labor/land costs 
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local economic outcomes. The local 40-minute and the regional three-hour 
market sizes were consistent strong factors that affect industry employment 
concentration, industry labor productivity, and foreign export proportion in 
trade and in service industrial sectors. However, these factors are less strong 
in the manufacturing, construction, and industrial utility sectors. Finally, 
transportation cost is an important factor in agglomeration economies. The 
effect of reducing inter-city transportation costs can be represented by 
agglomeration or dispersion of firms and workers. The effect of accessibility 
also varies among different industries. 
 




Urban economics started on the question of how the economy in a region is 
spatially organized. Thünen (1826) formulated the theoretical basis of the 
urban economy and analyzed agricultural land use through the bid–rent curve. 
Alonso (1964) designed a monocentric city model that involves commuters 
and the central business district, with the assumption of transportation costs 
included. According to Alonso (1964), the urban economic model can be 
expanded from its basic form to a time-extended model that introduces the 
time costs of commuting and time constraint. Beckmann (1973) subsequently 
assumed that the family structure of a household is characterized by two 
parameters: d as the number of dependent members and n as the number of 
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working members. Each working member of the household is assumed to 
incur the same pecuniary transportation costs and to receive the same wage 
rate despite budget constraints.  
These assumptions were applied to the basic or the extended model for 
research purposes and for the development of urban economic models such as 
the non-monocentric characteristic of modern metropolitan regions. Although 
these cities have a traditional downtown area, they can typically have a 
number of subcenters that can compete with the firms in the downtown area in 
terms of employment (Fujita et al., 1999). Fujita and Ogawa (1982) observed 
that the trade-off between commuting costs and land rental prices supports 
polycentric urban structures. Similarly, with regard to urban system, Mills 
(1967) and Henderson (1974, 1980, 1988) focused on the change in city size 
and on the relationship between city size and residents’ utility.  
Urban economics contributes to providing the basis of spatial economic 
theory, such as land use and location choice within and around cities or 
regions in the urban spatial structural aspect. However, the more borderless 
global economies become and the more perfectly mobile production factors 
develop, spatiality becomes an important aspect of economies. This study 
focuses on where, how, and why economic activities occur and spread out, 
when a spatial concentration of economic activities is considered sustainable, 
and what conditions or small differences among regions can grow into large 
differences over time through mobility and agglomeration economies.  
NEG is developed from the model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which 
considered transportation cost, mobility, and monopolistic competition in 
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regional economies. NEG increases returns instead of maintaining these 
returns because of differences among regions. In the new trade theory from 
NEG, Helpman and Krugman (1985) explained the “home market effect” that 
occurs when imperfectly competitive industries concentrate their production 
in large markets and export to small ones, with the implication of trade and 
location theories through transportation costs.  
Krugman (1991) developed a simple two-region model that demonstrated 
how a country can endogenously transform into an industrialized “core” and 
an agricultural “periphery.” This transformation depended on factors such as 
transportation costs, economies of scale, and the share of manufacturing to the 
national income, as well as on how mobile workers spend their income in the 
region where they are active. The geographical concentration of industries 
consequently generates an additional demand for manufactured goods because 
of low transportation costs and mobile production factors. 
Therefore, location choice and transportation costs, which have a trade-off 
relationship, are the key factors in urban economic theory. This study 
designed a simple two-region model based on the model of Alonso (1964) on 











































This study considers the choice probabilities of residential and working 
Urban economics 
Urban economic model Time-extend model Family-structure model 
Von Thünen (1826) Beckmann (1974) Beckmann (1973) 
 
Alonso (1964) Henderson (1973) 










Dixit and Stigliz (1977) 
New trade theory 
Krugman (1991) 
Helpman and Krugman 
 (1985) 
Fujita et al. (1999) 
Davis and Weinstein 
(1999) 
20 
sites, namely, four cases, and designs a simple two-region model according to 
Sorek (2009). Two regions are assumed. Travel refers to mobility travel only, 
such as commuting and migration, and it is accompanied by mobility cost. 
Mobility cost is categorized into commuting cost and migration cost. Only 
travel by road is costly. Commuting cost is incurred between two regions but 
not within each region. If the residential site is changed, migration cost is 
incurred. Shopping travel is not assumed. Commodities are traded between 
two regions, but consumption occurs only in the residential area. Therefore, 
transportation cost, such as the shipping (trade) cost of commodities, is 
incurred according to the trading of goods, which follows the iceberg form. 
Production occurs in any region. The commodities between two regions are 
heterogeneous, and only labor is a production factor. Agglomeration 
economies are represented as a function of the population. Mobility cost, 
including commuting and migration cost, and transportation cost are both 
exogenous. 
Total labor is given exogenously. Laborers represent four types of residence 
and work according to employment dispersion. The four groups are as follows: 
residing and working in Region 1; residing and working in Region 2; cross-
commuting between residential and work sites in which the residence is in 




Region 1                   Region 2 




Finally, households are categorized into four types based on residential and 
working sites, as shown in Table 2.2. Households house household members. 
 
Table 2.2 Cases for the Location of the Residential and Working Site 
Case I Case II Case III Case IV 
(1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 2) 
residing and working 
in region 1 
residing in region 1,  
but working in 
region 2 
residing in region 2,  
but working in 
region 1 
residing and working 
in region 2 
(i, j) = (residing, working) 
 
Laborers are supplied by the household, and house members produce k + 1 
times laborers in each house. The total population is k + 1 times laborer in 











        (2.1) 
 
Nij : Population in region i 








            (2.2) 
 
Firms produce heterogeneous commodities between the two regions, with 
laborers taking the Cobb–Douglas form. The presence of agglomeration 
economies implies that the personal interactions involved in the production 
and the sales of output contribute to the productivity of firms. Therefore, the 
                                           
2 Each region retains a minimum positive population. 
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price as a result of external economies exerts a decreasing effect. Each 




( )i i ii jiX Ag N L L
     ( j ≠ i )     (2.3) 
Xi : Aggregate output 
Ai : Scale factor 
Lii : Aggregate labor residing and working in region i 
Lji : Aggregate labor residing in region j, but working in region i 
g(Ni ) : Agglomeration economies function 
δ + θ = 1  
0 < δ , θ < 1 
 
Firms maximize their profit, and the conditional input demand functions for 
each laborer are as follows. Perfectly competitive firms operate in each region.  
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 maximize the utility when consuming heterogeneous 
commodities between the two regions. Commodities produced in a non-
residential area are consumed in the consumers’ residential area at the 
transportation cost-inclusive price because of the shipping (trade) of the 





ij ij ijU z z

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( i ≠ k )     (2.7) 
z
i
ij : Commodities produced in region i which are consumed by worker 
residing in region i and working in region j 
z
k
ij : Commodities produced in region k which are consumed by worker  
residing in region i and working in region j 
αij + βij = 1 
0 < αij , βij < 1 
 
The household income is basically the wage that household members earn. 
The total monthly income of a household is shown in Equation (2.8).  
 
2ij j ij ijy w H d c m    
     (2.8) 
 
where yij is the total monthly income of the household, excluding the mobility 
cost. H indicates the total monthly working time.
4
 In addition, d is the 
working days in a month, and c represents the commuting cost between the 
two regions. m is the migration cost, which is incurred only when the 
                                           
3 Only the household is assumed to supply labor and consume the commodities in each house 
in this model. 
4 This study did not adopt a time constraint because a simple two-region model was used 
instead of a time-extended model. 
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residential site is changed. 
Consequently, the household consumes each homogeneous commodity 
produced in each region to maximize utility. The budget constraint function of 
the household is shown in Equation (2.9). In addition, the Marshallian 
demands for each commodity are presented in Equations (2.11) and (2.12). 
 
Demand of the house 
'i k
ij i ij i ijy p z p z   
            (2.9) 
'
i k kip p t  





















            (2.12) 
 
where pi is the price of a commodity in Region i, and p
’
i represents the price 
of a commodity in Region k (pk) plus the transportation cost from the trading 
of commodities from Region k to Region i. In addition, tki represents the 
transportation cost from the shipping of commodities from Region k to 
Region i. z
i
ij is the commodity produced in Region i, which is consumed by a 
worker residing in Region i and working in Region j. Similarly, z
k
ij is the 
commodity produced in Region k, which is consumed by a worker residing in 
Region i and working in Region j. Finally, the maximized indirect utility 
function
5
 is suggested in Equation (2.13). 
 
                                           
















           (2.13) 
 
The choice of residential and working sites is needed to achieve the 
maximized indirect utility. This choice is probabilistic because of a probability 
error term, εij. Assuming that εij is independently identically distributed and 




, the choice 
probability of residential and working sites is equal to Equation (2.14). λ is 





























[max ] ln exp( )ij ij
i j
i j
W E U V

             (2.15) 
 
The general equilibrium is computed from the market clearing for output, 
labor, and firms’ zero profit condition. 
 
                                           
6 σ2 = π2 / 6λ2 
7 The probability that a randomly identified household chooses the residential and working site 
(i, j) to maximize the utility is calculated with the following quatrinomial logit model (Anas 
and Rhee, 2007). 
Prij = Prob [Uij > Uks ;  (i, j) ≠ (k, s)] = Prob [Vij + εij > Vks + εks ;  (i, j) ≠ (k, s)]  
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The mobility scenarios that represent commuting or migration in the 
original cases are discussed through a comparative analysis in the next section.  
 
Table 2.3 Mobility Scenarios from Changing the Residential and Working Site 
Origin Alternative I Alternative II Alternative III Alternative IV 







and working site 
(Migration) 
- 
(2, 1) - - - (2, 2) 
- - - - 
Changing 
working site 
(i, j) = (residing, working) 
 
2.5 Comparative Analysis 
 
2.5.1 Indirect Utility and Mobility 
 
We assume four alternatives with regard to labor or population mobility. 
The symmetric spatial distribution of population is initially assumed: N1 = N2.  
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Alternative I: Changing the working site from Region 1 to Region 2 
From L11 to L12, only the laborer can change the working site through 
commuting. The population of Region 1 does not change. The real income 
that a laborer residing in Region 1 but working in Region 2 earns decreases 
because of commuting cost c12. The indirect utility V12’ is negative in L12. This 
result may be related to the commuting cost. 
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








































In this case, even if the laborer’s mobility occurs, the total population in 
each region does not change. Changing the working site without any subsidy 
or incentive does not benefit inducing to commute to Region 2. Moreover, 
additional subsidy or incentives are needed to induce commuting to Region 2 
on the condition of the indirect utility V11 < V12’ because of dc12 > w2H. Finally, 
commuting affects the regional economy negatively, even if commuting 
occurs for any reason. 
 
Alternative II: Migrating to Region 2 and retaining the working site in Region 1 
From L11 to L21, the population, including laborers, migrates to Region 2, 
but these laborers remain in Region 1, and commuting occurs from Region 2 
to Region 1. Thus, the population in Region 2 increases. Nominal wage in 
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Region 2 then increases. The commuting cost is incurred after moving from a 
residential site in Region 1 to a residential site in Region 2. Migration cost is 
also incurred at the same time. Indirect utilities V21’ and V11 are negative in L21. 
However, V12 and V22 
are positive in L21. These changed are related to the 
increasing nominal wage in Region 2 from migration. 
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In this case, V11 is not equal to V21’ because the commuting cost plus the 
migration cost incurred from migrating to Region 2 is greater than 0. Hence, 
retaining the work site in Region 1 does not benefit migrating to Region 2.  
 
Alternative III: Migrating to Region 2 and changing the working site  
From L11 to L22, the population, including the laborers, migrates to Region 2, 
and the working site also changes. The population in Region 2 increases. The 
nominal wage in Region 2 also increases, whereas the nominal wage in 
Region 1 decreases. Migration cost is incurred. Indirect utility V22’ is positive 
in L22. This result is caused by the increasing wage in Region 2. 
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Migration decreases the population in Region 1. Possibly, V22’ > V11 if w2H 






)]. Finally, if the household income is large 
enough to cover the migration cost without any subsidy or incentive, 
migration benefits the population, including the laborers. 
 
Alternative IV: Changing the working site from Region 1 to Region 2 
From L21 to L22, only the work site is changed; the population in Region 2 
does not change. Real income increases because no commuting cost is 
incurred from the change in working site. Hence, indirect utility V22’ is 
positive in L22. 
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Each population does not change. If V21 is equal to V22’, any subsidy or 
incentive is needed because of the original commuting cost. Moreover, more 
subsidy is needed to maintain V22’ < V21 because of dc21 > w1H. Finally, 
residing and working in the same area is more beneficial in Region 2 than 
residing in Region 2 and working in Region 1 in the regional economy. 
In summary, the population, including the laborers, migrates to Region 2, 
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and the working site is changed from Region 1 to Region 2, as shown in 
Alternative III. However, if the household income is not large enough to cover 
the migration cost, a subsidy or incentive needs to be provided to migrants. In 
Alternative IV, subsidy is always provided to commuters. Hence, changing the 
working site is beneficial. Finally, residing and working in the same region 
(i.e., Region 2) is more beneficial than residing and working in different areas, 
such as in Region 1 or Region 2, respectively. Indirect utility is also directly 
related to the nominal wage or real income. 
 
2.5.2 Indirect Utilities, Mobility, and Transportation Costs 
 
Indirect utility is affected by mobility and the transportation cost because 
these costs are related to real income and the commodity’s price. 
 
Alternative I: Changing the working site from Region 1 to Region 2 
1 1
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Figure 2.4 shows that the ratio of indirect utilities is affected by the 
transportation cost related to the trade of the commodity. Particularly in β11 
and β12, the parameters for the preference for consumption commodity 
produced in Region 2 affect the ratio of the two indirect utilities. If a laborer 
who resides in Region 1 but works in Region 2 prefers the commodity 
produced in Region 2 more than a laborer who resides and works in Region 1, 
then the gap of indirect utility in the transportation cost increases. The 
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increasing transportation cost is evident in the price and affects the indirect 
utility negatively. However, if a laborer who resides and works in Region 1 
prefers the commodity produced in Region 2, the production of this 
commodity in Region 2 increases and ultimately raises the nominal wage in 
Region 2. This effect increases the welfare of the population, including the 
laborers residing in Region 1 but working in Region 2. Hence, the ratio of 
indirect utilities will be lower than 1 and will continue to decrease even if the 




Figure 2.4 Transportation Cost and Indirect Utilities 
 
In relation to the commuting cost and the ratio of indirect utilities, the gap 
between the two indirect utilities increases according to the rising commuting 
cost subject to w2H > 2dc12. Therefore, changing the work site is not 
beneficial. This result is provided in the comparative analysis. 
 
















12 11   
 





Figure 2.5 Commuting Cost and Indirect Utilities 
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(2.24) 
 
Figure 2.6 shows that if the transportation cost t12 increases, the price of the 
commodity produced in Region 1 also increases. Therefore, the indirect utility 
for laborers residing in Region 2 but working in Region 1 is negatively 
affected after migration. Finally, the gap for indirect utilities widen based on 
the increase in transportation cost t12. However, when the transportation cost 
t21 increases, the gap for indirect utilities decreases. Thus, the price of the 
commodity produced in Region 2 is paid by the laborer residing and working 










       
Figure 2.6 Transportation Cost and Indirect Utilities 
 
In the relationship between mobility cost, commuting cost plus migration 
cost, and ratio of indirect utilities, the gap between the two indirect utilities 
increases based on the increasing mobility cost subject to w1H > 2dc21 + m21. 
Finally, migrating but maintaining the work site in Region 1 is not beneficial 
in the long run because of the increasing mobility cost. 
 
Figure 2.7 Mobility Cost and Indirect Utilities 
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produced in Region 1 increases. Hence, the indirect utility a laborer residing 
in Region 2 obtains after migration is negatively affected. Finally, the gap of 
indirect utilities widens according to the increasing transportation cost t12. 
However, when the transportation cost t21 increases, the gap of indirect 
utilities decreases. This result is related to the price of commodity produced in 
Region 2, which is paid by the laborer residing and working in Region 1. This 
result negatively affects indirect utility V11. 
 
     
Figure 2.8 Transportation Cost and Indirect Utilities 
 
In relation to the migration cost and the ratio of indirect utilities, the gap 
between the two indirect utilities increases according to the rising migration 
cost, subject to w2H > m22. However, migration cost is incurred at a time. If 
the nominal wage in Region 2 is large enough to cover the migration cost 
without any subsidy or incentive, migration results in benefits. Determining 


































Figure 2.9 Migration Cost and Indirect Utilities 
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Figure 2.10 shows that the ratio of indirect utilities is affected by the 
transportation cost related to the trade of commodity. Particularly in β22 and 
β21, the parameters for the preference of consumption commodity produced in 
Region 1 affect the change in the ratio of the two indirect utilities. If a laborer 
residing in Region 2 but working in Region 1 prefers a commodity produced 
in Region 1 more than a laborer residing and working in Region 2, the gap 
between the indirect utility and the transportation cost decreases. The 
increasing transportation cost is evident in the price and affects the indirect 
utility negatively. However, the production of commodity in Region 1 also 
increases and ultimately raises the nominal wage in Region 1. The 
transportation cost effect is stronger than the nominal wage effect. However, if 
a laborer residing and working in Region 2 prefers a commodity produced in 









increases. The increasing transportation cost is shown in the price and affects 
the indirect utility negatively.  
 
Figure 2.10 Transportation Cost and Indirect Utilities 
 
In relation to the commuting cost and the ratio of indirect utilities, the gap 
between the two indirect utilities decreases according to the rising commuting 
cost subject to w1H > 2dc21. Finally, changing the work site is beneficial. This 
result is used in the comparative analysis. 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Commuting Cost and Indirect Utilities 
 
In summary, the ratio of or the gap between indirect utilities is affected by 

















22 21   
 










transportation and mobility costs. In Alternatives III and IV, migration or 
changing the working site reconciles the residential site to the working site. 
Transportation cost affects the price of the commodity and hence the indirect 
utility. 
 
2.5.3 Agglomeration Effect and Indirect Utilities 
 
Agglomeration economies arise from the total population in each region. 
The indirect utility may be affected by agglomeration factors, parameters, and 
population size. The agglomeration effects of the increasing region size 
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(2.27) 
 
Alternative I: Changing the working site from Region 1 to Region 2 
2 2 12 12/' '
12 12 2 12 1 1( 2 ) ( )
N
V Ae p H dc p p




In Alternative I, the population in each region is constant, and the indirect 
utility changes in a declining degree or according to elasticity ν. The indirect 
utility is opposite in ν. Thus, the indirect utility that laborers residing in 
Region 1 but working in Region 2 use is affected only by a declining degree 




Alternative II: Migrating to Region 2 and retaining the working site in Region 1 
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If the population, including the laborers, migrates, the laborer still works in 
Region 1 and commutes to Region 1. However, the population in Region 2 
increases. Thus, the indirect utility the laborer residing in Region 2 but 
working Region 1 uses declines from the reduced agglomeration effects. In 
the change of ν, the slope of the indirect utility becomes steep. 
  
Alternative III: Migrating to Region 2 and changing the working site  
2 2 22 22/' '
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The population, including the migrating laborer, and the working site 
change. Therefore, the population in Region 2 increases. The indirect utility 
the laborer residing and working in Region 2 uses increases from the 
improved agglomeration effects. Moreover, in the change of ν, the slope of the 
indirect utility is less steep. Alternative IV follows the indirect utility of 
Alternative III.  
Finally, residing and working in the same region (i.e., Region 2) is more 
beneficial than residing and working in different areas (i.e., Region 1 or 
Region 2). Hence, the residential site needs to be reconciled with the working 
site, especially if the transportation cost negatively affects the indirect utility. 
In addition, the laborer’s indirect utility decreases his/her mobility cost. 
Agglomeration economies improve in the increasing population. Finally, the 
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indirect utility that the laborer residing and working in Region 2 after the 
mobility uses increases from the improved agglomeration effects. 
 
2.6 Numerical Simulation 
 
The labor dispersion between SMA and the Chungchong regions, as well as 
their effect on regional economies, is discussed with numerical simulation. 
The change in commuting and transportation costs is considered under static 
conditions. The initial data for labor and production were obtained from 
Statistics Korea.
8
 The labor dispersion in each residing and working site was 
interpreted as the change rate of the initial value set to 100.  
Figures 2.12 and 2.13 illustrate the change rate in labor dispersion in each 
location by the choice of residing and working site, which depend on the 
change in commuting and transportation costs, respectively. Four dimensions 
were given. The first dimension indicates the case of residing in the SMA 
region but working in the Chungchong region. The second dimension is the 
case of residing and working in the Chungchong region. The third case 
represents the case of residing in the Chungchong region but working in the 
SMA region. The fourth dimension represents the case of residing and 
working in the SMA region. The change rate of four labor dispersions 
responds to the change in transportation cost steeply. If the transportation and 
commuting costs increase, the number of laborers residing and working in the 
SMA region and the number of laborers residing in the Chungchong region 
                                           
8 The number of laborers residing in the SMA region was 11 million. The number of laborers 
residing in the Chungchong region was 3.5 million. 
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but working in the SMA region decrease. However, the choice probabilities of 
residing in the SMA region but working in the Chungchong region and that of 
residing and working in the Chungchong region increase. Finally, the 
population in the Chungchong region increases, which indicates the dispersion 
of population to the Chungchong region.  
 
 
(i, j) = (residing, working) 
Figure 2.12 Labor Dispersion in Each Location of Residing and Working Site 
Depending on Change of Commuting Cost 
 
Figure 2.14 shows the positive relationship between the number of laborers 
residing in the Choungchong region and the higher transportation cost, which 
refers to the dispersion of labor and population from the SMA region to the 
Chungchong region. However, the concentration in the SMA region is favored 
by the reduction in transportation cost, which has been demonstrated by 
Krugman (1991), Kilkenny (1998), and others.
9
 At a lower transportation cost, 
more laborers reside in the SMA region
10
, the population of which ultimately 
                                           
9 Murata and Thisse (2005) suggest that a higher transportation cost fosters labor concentration 
and agglomeration. 
10 Originally, 11 million laborers out of the total 14.5 million laborers in the two regions 
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increases. Commuting cost shows a similar trend. However, the dispersion 
speed in the increasing transportation cost is expectedly higher than the 
increasing commuting cost from Figures 2.12 and 2.13. 
 
 
(i, j) = (residing, working) 
Figure 2.13 Labor Dispersion in Each Location of Residing and Working Site 
Depending on Change of Transportation Cost 
 
 
Figure 2.14 Transportation Cost and Labor Dispersion between Two Regions 
 
Figures 2.15 and 2.16 illustrate the relationship between the transportation 
or commuting costs and utilities. Higher transportation or commuting costs 
negatively affect the utilities, even if they contribute to labor and population 
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in the case of increasing commuting cost. 
 
 
Figure 2.15 Utilities Depending on Change of Commuting Cost 
 
 
Figure 2.16 Utilities Depending on Change of Transportation Cost 
 
Finally, Figures 2.17 and 2.18 show that the output in the Chungchong 
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Figure 2.17 Output in Each Region Depending on Change of Commuting Cost 
 
 
Figure 2.18 Output in Each Region Depending on Change of Transportation 
Cost 
 
Consequently, the lower transportation and commuting costs fostered the 
labor and population concentration in the SMA region and hence led to 
agglomeration. Paradoxically, higher transportation and commuting costs 
induce labor and population dispersion to the Choungchong region, including 
Sejong City, and positively affect the output growth. However, the social 
welfare decreases, as Kilkenny (1998) indicates. Kilkenny (1998) pointed out 
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Therefore, subsidies and tax policies are needed to achieve labor and 
population dispersion in the Choungchong region, including Sejong City, 




This study aims to analyze the effect of labor or population mobility 
between the two regions on regional economies. Indirect utility is directly 
related to nominal wage or real income. Residing and working in the same 
region are found to be beneficial. Indirect utility is also maximized when the 
residence follows the work site in the mobility. The ratio of or the gap 
between indirect utilities is affected by transportation and mobility costs. The 
transportation cost negatively affects indirect utility. A laborer’s indirect 
utility decreases in his mobility cost. Agglomeration economies improve in 
the increasing population. Finally, the case of residing and working in the 
same region is more beneficial than residing and working in different regions. 
As a result, the residential site needs to be reconciled with the work site. For 
Sejong City, the residential and work sites need to be reconciled without 
having to commute to the SMA region. If the residential location does not 
follow the work site in the mobility process, indirect utility is decreased. 
Finally, the key issue is the policy of migration to Sejong City for a short 
period of time, which needs to involve subsidies or incentives. Agglomeration 
economies depend on the number of migrants who settle in Sejong City. 
Consequently, economic activities should be relocated in the target region. 
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Numerical simulation showed that high transportation and commuting costs 
induce labor and population dispersion to the Choungchong region, including 
Sejong City, and positively affect the output growth. However, social welfare 
also decreases. Therefore, subsidies and tax policies are needed to achieve 
labor and population dispersion in the Choungchong region, including Sejong 
City, without a decrease in welfare. 
This study applied a simple two-region model to study the effect of 
mobility. However, it only considered commuting and migrating in a limited 
geographical region, as well as excluded migration from outside places. The 
optimal size for the population, including migration from outside places, 
needs to be examined further. The model may need to consider transportation 
and mobility costs, including time constraints. A dynamic model that includes 
changes in commuting or migration patterns between overlapping generations 
can be considered in future research. As an important factor that induces the 







Asymmetric Patterns of Regional Income  
Growth and Decline 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Traditionally, the South Atlantic and the Northeast areas have been 
regarded as rich regions according to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
For example, Maryland grew more during the recovery periods after the 
economic recession in 2001 and outperformed the national average by (+) 0.6% 
in the recent recession periods that begun in 2007.
11
 However, based on its 
real GRP (Gross Regional Product), West Virginia underperformed during the 
economic booming periods in the 1990s and declined even further during the 
economic recession in 2001. Likewise, Mississippi underperformed the 
national level in the late 1980s, but outperformed the national average in the 
early 1990s. However, during the economic boom that occurred in the middle 
1990s, the regional economy of Mississippi declined compared with the 
national economic growth. It showed (-) 0.1% growth during the economic 
recession in the 2000s and recorded a growth rate of (+) 1.1% from 2009 to 
2010 after the recent recession periods, both of which were below the national 
average. What was worse, the hardest hit was Mississippi, where the poverty 
rate was almost one-third, whereas the states with the lowest poverty rate 
                                           
11 Details of the changes in real GRP by state are in appendix I. 
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were found to be those in the Northeast and the North Central Regions.
12 
These cases exemplify asymmetric patterns of economic growth and decline. 
Furthermore, the recurrence of decline patterns could contribute to poverty 
and low development, which in turn, can result in an increased number of less 
developed regions with high poverty rate.
13
 In addition, the low growth in the 
less developed regions could become permanent and structured. At present, 
the global economic slump caused by the debt and financial crises in Europe 
has worsened the condition in the low growth regions.  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the income growth patterns of the 
less developed regions and to examine why such regions continuously show 
low income growth. Earlier studies have dealt with the determinants of the 
regional income growth, dynamic income growth patterns, and the spatial 
dependence of the regional economies. In comparison, the current study 
focuses on the asymmetric income growth structure of the developed and the 
less developed regions, including the estimation of the neighboring effects
14
 
of the regional income growth. This current study reviews how the regional 
income growth of the developed and the less developed regions affects the 
income growth of their neighbors. This current study also discusses how the 
less developed regions augment their low income level. The present analysis 
focuses on the target periods from 1998 to 2009 when the economic shock 
                                           
12 US poverty is concentrated in certain regions and sub-regions located mainly in the South. 
However, poverty tends to persist in the same geographic locations decade after decade 
(Wimberley and Morris, 2003). 
13  US defines less developed regions as those where the poverty rate and the average 
unemployment rate are more than 1.5 times of the national average, and with a GRP per capita 
that is under 67% of the national average. 
14 Neighboring effect is defined as the growth effect of other regions except the focal region in 
this study. This study considers other regions as contiguous to the focal region depending on the 
spatial weighted matrix. 
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occurred in 1997 in Korea. Data by region include information sourced 
mainly from Statistics Korea. The Mining and Manufacturing Survey Data are 
used to estimate GRP due to the limited regional data. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows. First, it discusses the sources of the regional economic 
growth. Then, it presents a model of the asymmetric patterns of regional 
income growth. Next, it estimates the effects of the income growth on the 
neighboring regions. Finally, it presents the concluding remarks and the policy 
implications of the study. 
 
3.2 Sources of Regional Economic Growth 
 
Previous studies on regional economic growth have explored the positive 
effects of physical capital, infrastructure, human capital, R&D, and policy 
matters. The neoclassical approach has emphasized the role of factor supplies 
in the growth process, whereas technical progress determines the rate at which 
output per worker increases over the long run (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). 
The neoclassical growth model identifies three sources of output growth: 
factor mobility and growth (e.g., labor and capital), population growth and 
R&D, and knowledge-spillover. In addition, agglomeration economies, such 
as concentration process, localization phenomena and diversity in industrial 
structure and region (city) size, are important factors in regional economic 
growth. 
 
Capital Accumulation and Investment 
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The standard neoclassical growth model assumes that the economy has 
some amounts of capital (K), labor (L), and knowledge (A). (AL) represents 
effective labor. The initial levels of labor, knowledge, and capital are given in 
time t, as shown in Equation 3.1.
15
 k represents the amount of capital per unit 
of effective labor. In addition, n and g are exogenous and represent population 
and knowledge growth at constant rates, respectively. s is saving rate and δ is 
depreciation rate, which illustrates that the saving exists considering the 
poverty trap. Hence, the saving rate is the exogenous function of the capital 
stock per unit of effective labor, s(k). Finally, the fraction of output is devoted 
to investment. The standard neoclassical growth model analyzes the behavior 
of capital. The key feature of the neoclassical growth model is the exogenous 
saving rate. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( )k t s k f k t n g k t        (3.1) 
s.t ( ( ) ) ( )f k t k t    
 
The path of neoclassical economic growth follows the dynamics of k 
(Equation 3.1). Here, k and actual investment per unit of effective labor are 
determined by the capital elasticity, the depreciation rate, the saving rate, and 
the output growth. For example, Kang et al. (2011) have argued that capital 
infusion from foreign or domestic sources and the saving rate are critical to 
recovery based on the dynamics of capital accumulation in the neoclassical 
economic growth model. By applying a variant of the overlapping generation 
                                           
15 Refer to Romer (2001). 
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growth model, they explained the differences in recovery patterns detected in 
postwar periods between the developed and the developing countries through 
the dynamics of capital accumulation and political capacity. Equation 3.1 was 
calibrated from macro data assuming the low growth and the poverty trap in 
the less developed regions. This equation differs from that used in the 
previous cases
16
 in Sachs (2004). Figure 3.1 illustrates the calibrated results, 
in which two steady states, k
Low
 and k*, are in the less developed regions.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Poverty Trap in the Less-Developed Regions 
 
Note: It was revised from Romer (2001). 
 
The poverty trap from the low growth in the less developed regions, such as 




, was identified. The low growth in the less 
developed regions led to the low saving rate, which could not accumulate the 
capital. If the less developed regions started out below k
Low
, they would just 
increase until they reach the low steady state. Moreover, if they started out 
between k
T
 and k*, and therefore had a high saving rate depending on the 
                                           
16 Sachs (2004) explained that the poverty trap occurs because of three cases: the lowest capital 
below a minimum threshold of capital, the low or negative saving rate, and the rapid population 
growth, as shown in Equation 3.1. Detailed explanations of the three cases leading to poverty 
and the calibration process are shown in Appendices II and III. 
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increase of saving, they would increase until they reach the high steady state. 
With the slow development, the saving rate was insufficient and investment 
was so low that it could only sustain a very small capital stock. Finally, the 
structural poverty trap interval from the low growth occurred in the less 
developed regions. 
Moreover, both k and investment were expected to be sensitive depending 
on the capital share and the depreciation, respectively. In this work, the capital 
share rate and the depreciation rate were adjusted assuming that there was no 
change in the output growth and in the saving rate as exemplified by three 
cases. First, as shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, if the output elasticity of capital 
increased without the change of the depreciation rate, the output and 
investment would increase with the rising k. Thus, the new high steady state 
of k*'' would have more capital stock and investment (Figure 3.2). Conversely, 
if the depreciation rate decreased without the change of the output elasticity of 
capital, (n+g+δ) k would decrease and k would rise. The new high steady 
state of k*', as shown in Figure 3.2, would have more capital stock and 
investment.  
 
Figure 3.2 Output Elasticity of Capital and Depreciation Rate 
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Finally, if the output elasticity of capital increased and the depreciation rate 
decreased, the output and investment would increase further with the rising k. 
The largest capital stock and investment are shown in Figure 3.3. In summary, 
the order of the increase of k and investment is as follows: 
 
decreasing δ in constant α < increasing α in constant δ < increasing α, decreasing δ 
(a) (b)    
 
where (a) and (b) mean a sign of inequality in k and investment. If the 
decreasing rate of the depreciation rate were higher than the increasing rate of 
the output elasticity of capital, the condition (a) would not be satisfied and the 
sign would be changed reversely. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Change of Capital Stock from Adjusting Output Elasticity of Capital and 
Depreciation Rate 
 
Consequently, the increase of the output elasticity of capital and the 









, if there were no 
change in the output growth and the saving rate. However, if the parameters 
(α, δ) were constant, the saving rate or capital stock would grow through the 
output growth, representing the virtuous cycle in the regional economic 
growth. Similarly, Sachs (2004) concluded that extreme poverty leads to the 
low national saving rate, which in turn leads to the low or negative economic 
growth rate. This results in a vicious cycle mechanism in the regional 
economic growth.  
 
Human Capital   
To drive the output growth and accumulate capital stock, the role of factors 
of regional economic growth must be reinforced, especially when disparity in 
the regional economic growth occurred because of differences in factors and 
production technology. Human capital is one such important factor. In relation 
to this, such factors as the cultivation and movement of human capital as well 
as the effect of human capital on the national or regional economies must also 
be considered. 
The intentional accumulation of knowledge through educational 
investments cultivates human capital. Moreover, human capital in a region is 
reallocated spatially and migrated among regions. Universities often perform 
the dual roles of fostering and upgrading human capital and assisting in the 
dissemination of knowledge through formal and informal networks (Weinstein, 
2000). Anselin et al. (2000) suggested that universities not only motivate 
people to conduct basic research but also draw human capital to a region. 
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Traditionally, when it comes to the cultivation of human capital, developed, 
developing, and industrialized economies prioritize secondary education, both 
primary and secondary education and tertiary education, respectively, 
although more importance has been given to educational research and policy 
in the industrialized economies in recent years (Faggian and McCann, 2009). 
According to Faggian and McCann (2009), the competitiveness of a region to 
maintain its human capital and induce it from other regions has also been 
given importance. They stressed that the highly educated workforce in a 
region have been attracted by the innovativeness in that region. One example 
is the region-specific learning process. 
Higher level of physical capital as well as educational system induces 
human capital (Acemoglu, 1996). In addition, a few metropolitan areas reap 
the advantages stemming from agglomeration economies, especially services 
that attract an increase of people concentration (Glaeser and Kohlhase 2003). 
Both industrial structure (Moretti, 2004) and agglomeration (Berry and 
Glaeser, 2005) are emerging factors in the movement of human capital within 
the urbanized regions. Empirically, Breschi and Lenzi (2010) concluded that 
skilled workers tend to reside in the metropolitan area in the US from simple 
descriptive figures. They used the patent data on inventors to track their 
mobility. Finally, regarding the spatial patterns of the inventors’ mobility, not 
surprisingly, they involved almost exclusively metropolitan benefits (i.e., 
knowledge spillovers) arising from the migration of highly-skilled workers. 
This finding is consistent with the those on the spatial patterns of mobility of 
UK graduates who obtained their first employment (Faggian and McCann 
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2006, 2009). However, the lack of appropriate local conditions impedes the 
adoption of diffused technological innovation (Nijkamp and Poot, 1998). 
Human capital affects regional economy through the productivity of each 
worker and the positive externalities of the productivity of the regional 
economy. However, reallocation of human capital does not necessarily reduce 
interregional disparities, which means that the neoclassical economic 
convergence does not work as a theory (Van Dijk et al., 1989). Sterlacchini 
(2008) found that the effects of human capital on the regional economic 
growth vary depending on the regional development level. By contrast, 
Fleisher et al. (2010) concluded that human capital investment in the less 
developed areas would be rational in terms of efficiency. Dao (2010) found 
that the growth of GDP per capita is linearly dependent on net migration of 
skilled workers in the developing countries from the World Bank data of 46 
developing economies. As a result, Dao (2010) insisted that an increase in net 
migration from removing restrictions on labor mobility would positively 
influence economic growth in developing countries. 
In conclusion, the accumulation of human capital is dominated by regional 
competitiveness, such as educational system, physical capital, agglomeration, 
and industrial structure. The effect of human capital on the regional economic 
growth depends significantly on the degree of the regional development or the 
regional amenities. Therefore, the less developed regions do not have 
comparative advantages to attract human capital compared with the developed 
regions. Furthermore, these would continue to trigger the brain-drain of 
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human capital in the less developed regions.
17
 Secondary or tertiary education 
and high-level job-training for workers in the developed regions might be 
useless or needless in the less developed regions due to the differences in 
industrial structures in those regions (i.e., some may be weak). 
 
Localization and Urbanization Economies 
The two kinds of agglomeration economies are localization economies and 
urbanization economies. The other kinds are called external diseconomies or 
negative agglomeration economies. Marshall (1920) clarified the meaning of 
localization economies. Several factors lead to the clustering of firms. First, 
clustering allows individual plants to specialize more than they would if the 
firms in the same industry are widely dispersed. Second, clustering strongly 
facilitates research and innovation in an industry. Finally, the clustering of 
firms in the same industry reduces risks for workers and employers. Workers 
with industry-specific skills are potentially more mobile between firms if 
firms in the same industry are geographically concentrated; this is because 
changing jobs does not necessarily mean moving out of that region. Firms 
also have greater access to workers with relevant skills. In other words, 
localization economies result from the geographical concentration of plants in 
the same industry. It implies externalities in the intra-industry. Mills (1967) 
suggested that workers and firms cluster together from geographical 
concentrations in order to assert a greater scale of economy in the city and 
enhance productivity through technological innovations, greater employment 
                                           
17 Huang et al. (2002) pointed out the brain drain from rural areas because of the higher returns 
to human capital in urban markets. 
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opportunities, and abundant supply of intermediate goods. Agglomeration 
economies, such as urbanization economies caused by the geographical 
association of large economic activities, jointly serve different industries and 
the extension of the city scale highlight the variety of benefits of a diversified 
economy for the exchange of complementary knowledge among economic 
activities (Jacobs, 1969). Glaeser et al. (1992) found evidence for positive 
Jacobs-externalities from diversity in industrial structure using a data set on 
the growth of large industries in 170 US cities between 1956 and 1987. They 
found that local competition and urban variety encourages employment 
growth in industries and knowledge spillovers occur between rather than 
within industries. 
Agglomeration economies could generate positive external effects that 
could outweigh the negative effects, if these phenomena are accompanied by 
appropriate regional infrastructure investments (Karlsson et al., 2000). 
Moomaw (1986) employed population size and the number of production 
worker hours in the industry to estimate urbanization and localization 
economies. His analysis was based on different industries. For example, 
urbanization advantages increase for lumber, electrical, apparel, transportation 
equipment and instruments industries, whereas urbanization diseconomies are 
significant for petroleum refining. Similarly, Moomaw (1986) concluded that 
localization economies are created for apparel, nonelectrical machinery, 
furniture, and transportation equipment. Mills (2000) analyzed how the 
productivity of labor would increase by 5% to 10% if the city scale expanded 
twice its size. Porter (2003) analyzed the clustering in the trade industries and 
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found that they greatly affect the regional economy. Mizuno (2006) 
demonstrated how industrial diversity resulted in the reduction of 
unemployment in metropolitan area. He further analyzed the correlation 
between the concentration of manufacturing and the construction sector and 
found that the unemployment rate in metropolitan area was strongly negative. 
Baldwin et al. (2008) identified the geographic concentration of industry 
stimulated by the concentration of upstream suppliers, pools of skilled labor, 
and the exchange of knowledge and learned that it is an important determinant 
of labor productivity in Canada. In addition, they found the strong and 
positive geographical extent of knowledge spillovers on the location of 
individual manufacturing plants within 10 km of the plant, suggesting that 
physical distance is more important in terms of knowledge flows than political 
boundaries.  
However, Henderson (1986) discovered no significant correlation between 
city size and industrial productivity. In addition, Combes (2000) found that 
concentration negatively affects employment growth in France. Meanwhile, 
De Groot et al. (2009) found some strong indications of sectoral, temporal, 
and spatial heterogeneity of the effects of specialization, competition, and 
diversity on regional growth through meta-analysis, which are rather mixed. 
In summary, the effects of concentration or diversity on the industry sector 
and population size (city scale) on the regional economic growth are more 
mixed. Finally, as city size increased, the external diseconomies also 
increased, including crime, traffic congestion, environmental pollution, social 
conflict, racial externalities, and crowding externalities (Fujita, 1989). These 
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external diseconomies continue to affect the regional policies. They include 
congestion toll, subsidy, urban growth boundary, and tax policy. 
 
Devolution and Public Finance 
Previous works on government policies and regional growth are very few. 
Nevertheless, studying the economic growth at the regional level, the local 
government’s expenditure or tax and another regional development policy 
need to be considered first. The study of regional policies has been closely 
related to the analysis of decentralization, often referred to as fiscal federalism 
(Abreu and Savona, 2009). Regional policymakers hold discretionary 
authorities to allocate government expenditures to public goods and services, 
development projects, compensation, and other expenditures. Two 
perspectives for the regional economic growth regarding the effect of 
decentralization of public finance have been identified.  
First is the view that fiscal decentralization must be continued for better 
resource allocation. This might be because locally determined policies are 
better able to take account of regional and local conditions in the provision of 
public goods, such as infrastructure and education (Thornton, 2007). Netzer 
(1991) realized that the decentralized economic development policy would 
result in the overall benefits and convenience within the country due to the 
existing competition among other regions in other countries. Peterson (1995) 
stressed the active role of regional governments and investments for the 
regional economic development program. This idea came from modern 
federalism, which means that each level of government has its own 
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independently elected political leaders and its own separate taxing and 
spending capacity. Akai and Sakata (2002) and Stansel (2005) also asserted 
that the fiscal decentralization affects the regional economic growth in the US. 
In the allocation of regional government expenditures from decentralization, 
counties that spent more on highways, but had lower local taxes, recorded 
higher rate of growth in the US (Ruspasingha et al., 2002). In addition, the 
regional government could provide formal institutional support to stimulate 
local development initiatives by developing work facilities for community 
groups, establishing technical assistance, and making community-based 
initiatives a component of the overall local development strategy (Rupasingha 
and Goetz, 2007).  
Second, some conflicts could occur in the process of macro-economic 
policy coordination under fiscal decentralization. Bartik (1991) affirmed that 
the economic development policy by the regional government expenditure 
could not create the pure economic value generally, because it would incur 
additional external cost due to the competition among the local governments 
to attract a specific industry. Huang et al. (2002) reported that the net effect of 
local fiscal expenditures and county taxation is neutral or even a small 
negative on rural working-age populations. This is because the tax and 
expenditure policies have equal but opposite effects on the population, in 
accordance with the Tiebout model. Thornton (2007) found that fiscal 
decentralization statistically does not have significant effects on economic 
growth after examining the data of 19 OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) members. Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011) 
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noted the negative but significant association between fiscal decentralization 
and the economic growth in the 21 OECD sample countries they examined. 
Moreover, they learned that an increase in regional tax revenue hinders 
investment and employment due to excessive taxation in China, which is 
unfavorable to the regional economic growth (Chen and Wu, 2008). Abreu 
and Savana (2009) also stressed the optimum level of decentralization in the 
developed and the less developed regions. The effectiveness of specific 
regional policies depends on the extent of sectoral specialization across 
regions and the degree of regional variation in the initial endowments in 
physical and social infrastructure (Abreu and Savona, 2009). 
Consequently, fiscal decentralization may push regional economic growth 
or hinder it through regional government expenditure and regional taxation. 
The way by which the policymakers allocate the definite resources to various 
expenditures, such as the government consumption, investment and 
redemption of a local government department, is very vital. In fact, all 
regional policy-making has become an increasingly important factor in the 
goal of achieving economic development. 
 
Neighboring Effect 
Neighboring effect refers to the effect of the performance of neighboring 
economies. Neighboring effect has been analyzed in a range of theoretical and 
applied contexts and has proven to be of interest in understanding questions – 
ranging from the asymptotic properties of various evolutionary games to 
explaining the persistence of poverty in inner cities. Neighboring effect has 
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received much attention because it provides a way of understanding why 
poverty traps might exist based on the background of social theory. For 
example, supposing one way to think about a poverty trap is that a community, 
if initially comprised of poor members, will remain poor across long time 
periods and even across generations (Durlauf, 2004). Hence, capital cannot be 
accumulated from the low saving caused by poor members and the poverty 
traps will exist continuously. In the case of human capital, interdependence in 
behavior creates the possibility that if one has two communities – one where 
the adults are all college graduates and another where none is – that these 
communities will converge to different levels of college attendance in a steady 
state (Durlauf, 2004). 
Furthermore, the neighboring effect could be applied to business cycle, 
economic growth, land use, technology adoption, and preferences in 
consumption. As proof of preferences in consumption, Bell (2002) provided 
the negative feedback operating through the price system and the positive 
feedback expressed in the bandwagon effect. Finally, the agents’ preferences 
and consumption were completely polarized into stable regions in which 
every agent consumed the same good exclusively. Kelly (1997) developed a 
model of local transportation linkages and economic development that 
captured Adam Smith’s insights on market and specialization. This model has 
been discussed in the context of networks and neighboring effect. Irwin and 
Bockstead (2002) showed how neighboring interactions could affect long-
term patterns of land use. In this model the decision to develop a given parcel 
of land is seen to be affected by the development state of the neighboring 
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parcels. Allen (1982) analyzed technology adoption when network 
externalities are restricted to local neighboring. An and Kiefer (1995) 
addressed the question of technological adoption and provided conditions 
under which more efficient technologies are adopted and when they are not, 
considering the neighboring effect.  
In summary, the neighboring effect covers an enormous range of economic 
issues. It can influence neighboring formation, behavior, or economic 
activities. 
 
Table 3.1 Determinants of Regional Economic Growth 
Descriptions Determinants Representative previous studies 
Physical Capital Capital 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980), Acemoglu (1996), 





Romer (1986), Glaeser (1994), Acemoglu 
(1996), Bal and Nijkamp (1997), Black and 
Henderson (1999), Glaeser and Shapiro (2003), 
Cohen and Soto (2007), Sterlacchini (2008), 
Fleisher et al. (2010) 
Factor Mobility and 
Growth 
Borts and Stein (1964), Smith (1975), Kraay and 





in Industry Sector 
Marshall (1920), Jacobs (1969), Glaeser et al. 
(1992), Henderson et al. (1995), Combes (2000), 
Karlsson et al. (2000), Porter (2003), Mizuno 
(2006), Baldwin et al. (2008) 
Number of Firms Sheppard (1983) 
Population Growth 
Rate or Population / 
City Size 
Moomaw (1986) , Henderson (1986) , Glaeser et 
al. (1995), Mills (2000), Portnov (2004), Strulik 
and Weisdorf (2008) 
Accessibility to 
Metropolitan Area 
Lutz (2001), Monchuk et al. (2006) 
Policy Factors 
Local Government’s 
Expenditure or Tax 
Landau (1986), Netzer (1991), Bartik (1991), 
Rupasingha et al. (2002), Thornton (2007), 
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011) 
Policy and Political 
Factors 
Barro (1991), Homles (1998), Rupasingha and 
Goetz (2007) 
Neighboring Effect 
Allen (1982), Durlauf (1993, 2004),  
Kelly (1997), An and Kiefer (1995), Bell (2002), 
Irwin and Bockstead (2002) 
 
The determinants of the regional economic growth are summarized in Table 
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3.1 based on the previous literature review. In summary, apart from capital 
and labor as the basic input factors, agglomeration factors (such as city or 
population size and industrial structure), policy factor, neighboring effect, and 
human capital are also important because they reflect the regional 
characteristics. All of these will contribute to sustainable regional economic 
growth. In addition, Nash (1977) identified non-economic factors that 
contribute to economic development as well. This factor would be related to 
the notion that the less developed countries do not achieve the economic 




3.3.1 Data Analysis 
 
In this study, the less developed regions were identified depending on the 
average regional income level and regional income growth rate based on the 
real GRP
18
. For the analysis, data were collected from 224 regions in Korea
19
 
and covered the period from 1998 to 2009,
20
 right after the financial crisis in 
Korea. The average regional income level was defined as the relative real GRP. 
The differences in the annual growth could result in the modification of the 
relative ranking of each region’s income level. Based on the period under 
                                           
18 GRP by a region was calibrated from each region’s GRP and Value-added (VA) in Mining 
and Manufacturing Survey Data in 2007 from Statistics Korea because of the regional data 
limitation. 
19 These were the local administrative districts in Korea. The Ulsan metropolitan area was 
considered as one region and Jeju, Ulrung, and Ongjin islands were excluded.  
20 The regional data could be gathered respectively since 1998. 
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study, the relative real GRP of a region was averaged from 1998 to 2009. If 
the relative real GRP was higher than 1 then, income level of region i was 
considered better than the national average income in year t.
21
 Furthermore, 
regional income growth rate of GRP in region i was compared to the national 
income growth rate at period t against period t-k.
22
 There were four categories 
under regional income level, and the regional income growth rate was 
compared to the national level.  
 
HH: higher income level with higher growth rate; 
HL: higher income level with lower growth rate; 
LH: lower income level with higher growth rate; and 
LL: lower income level with lower growth rate. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the average regional income level and the regional 
income growth rate based on the 224 regions. In the same figure, 40 regions 
fell under the HH category as compared to the national level, which was 17.9% 
of the total regions. Under the LL category, there were 87 regions or 38.8% of 
the total regions expressing a lower regional income growth rate than the 
national level. Finally, LL regions were classified as the less developed 
regions, whereas the HH regions were considered the developed ones. 
Meanwhile, even though LH regions were lower in terms of the income level, 
these regions recorded rapid growth rates. 
 
                                           
21 yi,t = GRPi,t / [(       
 
   )/N] 




Figure 3.4 Divisions of Regions by Income Level and Income Growth Rate 
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the four-group classification based on income level 
and income growth rate. HH regions were concentrated in the Midwest area of 
Korea, while LL regions were mostly concentrated in the Eastern and South-
Western areas of Seoul, Korea. In the GRP ranking, most HH regions went up 
in the said ranking in 2009 against 1998, except for three regions. However, 
only 10 regions under the LL category moved higher in the GRP ranking in 
2009 against 1998.
23
 This implied that a low growth rates could become 
permanent and structured in most regions among the less developed ones, 
which could result in poverty and the vicious cycle of having low income 
level. 
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Figure 3.5 Classification of Regions by Income Level and Income Growth Rate 
 
In 1999, right after the financial crisis, 31 regions or 78% among HH 
regions recorded a higher regional income growth rate compared with the 
national income growth rate (in the year 1997
24
) that fostered a fast recovery 
among HH regions. On the contrary, only 33% among LL regions showed a 
higher regional income growth rate compared with the national income 
growth rate in 1999.
25
 This indicated that most LL regions slowly recovered 
from the crisis compared with the HH regions, thereby indicating an 
asymmetric structure of regional income growth among less developed 
regions. 
                                           
24 The national economic growth rate was 9.6%. The regional economic growth rates for 31 
regions among HH regions ranged from10.1% to 36.4%. 





3.3.2 Estimation of the Regional Income Model 
 
It is necessary to average the development experiences of the regions to 
determine their attributes in an event and to check whether or not their 
applicability can scope a universal event or can only be applied on a regional 
scope. Urban and regional development patterns generally change through 
various combinations of deindustrialization, such as population loss and 
growth, sunbelts and frostbelts, and metropolitan expansion stimulated by 
changing patterns of specialization and employments (Storper, 2011). The 
current study focused on the regional income growth of the developed and 
less developed regions. The regional income growth model was used to 
analyze both regions given an asymmetric regional income growth from 1998 
to 2009. Based on the previous studies, the independent variables (e.g., capital, 
labor, agglomeration factors, the degree of concentration in the manufacturing 
sector, degree of industrial diversity, population size, regional government’s 
tax revenue, and the asymmetric regional economic growth factor) were 
considered determinants of the regional income growth assuming there was no 
exogenous change in the technical progress. For labor, it was divided into two 
types, namely, the regular and temporary employees. The asymmetric regional 
income growth model was represented as follows: 
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GRPi,t : Gross Regional Product in region i at period t 
K : capital  
RL : regular employees 
TL : temporary employees 
T : regional government’s tax revenue 
P : population size  
LQM : degree of concentration in manufacturing sector
26
  
D : degree of industrial diversity
27
  




Data were gathered and calculated based on the Statistics Korea. All the 
variables, except the Dummy, were transformed into its logarithm, which was 
helpful in interpreting the elasticity and in maintaining the consistency of the 
data. 
Table 3.2 presents the results of estimating Equation (3.2). In column 2, the 
estimated coefficient of the asymmetric regional economic growth factor was 
negative and statistically significant at 1% significance level. This 
demonstrated that the asymmetric regional economic growth was evident 
among less developed regions. The structural factor led the less developed 
regions to low growth and impeded the growth of those economies as well.  
The current study also aimed to explain the factors contributing to the 
regional income growth were explained in the current study. The output 
                                           
26 The concentration of manufacturing sector was represented by LQMi = (Li,m / Li) / (Lm / L), 
where i and m meant respectively each region and manufacturing. L represented total 
employees in the nation. 
27 The index of industrial diversity in each region was calculated from Di = 1 – Σ |(Li,j / Li) – (Lj 
/ L)|, where i, j meant respectively each region and each industry sector. L represented total 
employees in the nation. 
28 If a region would record the lower growth than the national average comparing to the 
previous year, the value was noted as 1. 
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elasticity of capital was positively larger among less developed regions than 
those in developed ones, implying that the role of capital was more important 
in facilitating regional income growth among less developed regions. The 
marginal productivity of capital was higher by 0.091 compared with the 
developed regions. Martin (1998) noted that regions with low capital stocks 
and low income should have a higher return on capital based on Neoclassical 
Growth theory. The marginal labor productivity of regular and temporary 
employees was positively larger in developed regions. This proved that the 
effects of human capital on regional income growth depended on the regional 
amenities. For less developed regions, they might not have developed their 
comparative advantage to attract human capital unlike the developed regions. 
Among all regions, the regional government tax revenue has a negative effect 
on the regional income growth. Evident among less developed regions, the 
negative effect of the regional government tax revenue was greater and 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. The higher local tax burden 
or the excessive regional tax revenue generally affects the regional income 
growth negatively. This means that the local government and public sector 
play very important roles in the economic development of these regions. In 
addition, the central and the local governments should provide formal 
institutional support and assistance to stimulate local development initiatives. 
The goal of the central and local governments is to help the less developed 
regions escape low growth and poverty as well as to attain remarkable growth 
considering optimal tax burden. With regards agglomeration economies, 
column 1 showed that the developed regions have attained a high level of 
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urbanization economies through industrial diversity and localization 
economies through concentration in the manufacturing sector. Among less 
developed regions, localization economies through concentration in the 
manufacturing sector contributed to the regional income growth, while 
industrial diversity had no significant effect, implying that more than any 
other factor, the manufacturing sector should be reinforced. Moreover, 
localization economies related to the industrial structures were more 
important for the regional income growth for less developed regions. 
Levernier et al. (1998) reported that the greater employment among goods 
producing sectors is associated with a low level of poverty and higher regional 
economic growth. Birnie and Hitchens (1998) noted the improvement in the 
manufacturing productivity and further explained that the growth of 
manufacturing sector leads to the convergence of GDP per capita among the 
peripheral countries in the European Union (EU). 
 
Table 3.2 Estimation of Asymmetric Regional Income Model 
Regions Developed regions Less-developed regions 
Intercept 13.052*** 35.732*** 
Log (Capital) 0.076*** 0.167*** 
Log (Regular employees) 0.586*** 0.583*** 
Log (Temporary employees) 0.338*** 0.250*** 
Log (Regional government tax revenue) -0.045*** -0.253*** 
Log (Population size) 1.452*** -1.986*** 
Log (Population size) square -0.078*** 0.073*** 
Log (Degree of concentration in  
manufacturing Sector) 
0.060*** 0.335*** 
Log (Industrial diversity) 0.088*** -0.037*** 
Asymmetric Economic Growth Factor 
(Growing Less than National Average=1) 
-0.003*** -0.054*** 
F-value 76.92*** 439.10*** 
Adj R-Sq 58.05 78.66 
Note: *, **, and *** mean statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Finally, population size representing the size of the region showed a 
concave graphical illustration derived from developed regions. This implied 
the concept of diminishing marginal growth of population. However, for less 
developed regions, there was an increased marginal growth of population 
derived from the convexity of its graphical illustration.  
 
Table 3.3 Estimation of Asymmetric Regional Income Model for the Developed Regions 
Regions Population ≥ 0.5 Million Population < 0.5 Million 
Intercept -45.906*** 47.815*** 
Log (Capital) 0.176*** 0.063*** 
Log (Regular employees) 0.361*** 0.626*** 
Log (Temporary employees) 0.463*** 0.311*** 
Log (Regional government tax revenue) -0.120*** -0.039*** 
Log (Population size) 10.362*** -4.316*** 
Log (Population size) square -0.413*** 0.161*** 
Log (Degree of concentration in  
manufacturing Sector) 
-0.069*** 0.070*** 
Log (Industrial diversity) -0.258*** 0.169*** 
Asymmetric Economic Growth Factor 
(Growing Less than National Average=1) 
0.016*** -0.050*** 
F-value 29.89*** 59.91*** 
Adj R-Sq 65.83 59.71 
Note: *, **, and *** mean statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
In addition, Table 3.3 reports the results of the regression for developed 
regions based on the population size. There were different results regarding 
the population coefficient between the developed regions with a population of 
more than 500,000 and those with less than 500,000;
29
 the former showed a 
concave graphical illustration based on population size, while latter presented 
a convex illustration. The average population in regions with over 500,000 
was 695,017, which was considered overcrowded by 6.7%. With regards 
industrial structure, service sector was expected to contribute to the regional 
                                           
29 The average population of the developed regions was 403,000. In addition, the standard of 
decentralization is the population size of 500,000 in the local government Act of Korea. 
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income growth of the developed regions with over 500,000 based from 
column 1. 
Consequently, there was an asymmetric regional income growth structure 
among the less developed regions that hindered the regional income growth; 
the structural factor led to the low growth among the less developed regions. 
For agglomeration economies related to industrial structures, the concept of 
localization economies was clear based on less developed regions. Capital 
enlargement, reinforcement of the manufacturing basis, and a more active role 
in of regional government, including the optimal regional tax burden, were 
needed to facilitate regional income growth in the less developed regions. The 
urge to escape from the asymmetric regional economic growth pattern would 
persist in regional income growth and accumulation of capital stock, which 
would further lead to the output growth seen in the virtuous cycle. 
Furthermore, the improved comparative advantages and regional income 
growth in less developed regions would attract brain-gain. 
The asymmetric regional income growth model was employed to examine 
how the performance of neighboring economies affected the regional income 
growth. Mossi et al. (2003) suggested that a prosperous area would have a 
positive influence on a region’s economic performance. In analyzing the 
neighboring effect, a spatially weighted value for all neighboring regions’ 
GRP (except the focal region) was utilized for developed and less developed 
regions in relation to the asymmetric regional income growth model shown in 
Equations (3.3) and (3.4). Equation (3.3) included the GRP level of 
neighboring regions as the neighboring effect. In Equation (3.4) the GRP 
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differential between the neighboring region and the own focal region was 
used. These are respectively expressed as:  
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where W denotes the row-standardized spatial weighted matrix,
30
 which is 
derived through the rook continuity between region i and region j, and GRPj 
represents the GRP of other neighboring region j surrounding a certain 
developed or less developed region i.  
Table 3.4 presents the results of estimating neighboring effect for the 
developed and less developed regions. There were significant positive 
neighboring effects in the GRP level and GRP differential, and the values 
were 0.184 and 0.004 for the developed regions, respectively. This suggested 
that the developed regions were pushed by its neighboring regions based on 
the income level. Parameters of all other independent variables showed the 
same results as the asymmetric regional income growth model previously 
presented for the developed regions.  
                                           
30 This was based on the notion of binary contiguity between spatial units, which was 





Table 3.4 Estimation of Asymmetric Regional Income Model with Neighboring Effect 
Regions Developed Regions Less-Developed Regions 






Intercept 6.932*** 20.865*** 32.635*** 37.306*** 
Log (Capital) 0.094*** 0.068*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 
Log (Regular employees) 0.602*** 0.492*** 0.544*** 0.562*** 
Log (Temporary employees) 0.303*** 0.439*** 0.272*** 0.255*** 
Log (Regional government tax 
revenue) 
-0.107*** -0.151*** -0.300*** -0.279*** 
Log (Population size) 1.748*** 0.630*** -2.033*** -2.234*** 
Log (Population size) 2 -0.089*** -0.043*** 0.076*** 0.085*** 
Log (Degree of concentration in 
Manufacturing Sector) 
0.029*** 0.063*** 0.282*** 0.309*** 
Log (Industrial diversity) 0.088*** 0.100*** -0.021*** -0.036*** 
Asymmetric Economic Growth Factor 
(Growing Less than National Average=1) 
-0.003*** 0.008*** -0.051*** -0.054*** 
Log (GRP Level of Neighboring Regions) 0.184***  0.147***  
Log (GRP Differentials between Own 
Region and Each Neighboring Region)  
0.004***  -0.003*** 
F-value 74.45*** 96.71*** 406.16*** 419.93*** 
Adj R-Sq 60.07 66.24 79.85 79.86 
Note: *, **, and *** mean statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 presented the results of estimating neighboring effect for 
less developed regions. There was a positive neighboring effect in the GRP 
level given by the value of 0.147, which was significant at 1%. This value was 
smaller than in the case of developed regions, indicating that the neighboring 
regions pulled the economies of the less developed regions. In column 4, the 
GRP differential in the neighboring effect showed a significant negative effect 
on the regional income growth. Results identified that the regional economies 
of the less developed regions became more depressed as the gap between the 
less developed regions and the neighboring regions became bigger. As a result, 
they could not converge with the other developed regions. Therefore, the 
disparity of income must be reduced based on the regional income growth for 
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less developed regions. The coefficient of asymmetric economic growth factor 
has the same sign as that shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.5 shows that developed regions were categorized into four cases; it 
also shows the results of estimating the GRP level and GRP differentials in 
relation to the neighboring effects. In column 4, employing the GRP level, 
results showed that if the developed regions had less developed regions as 
their neighbors, the coefficient of regional income growth of the developed 
regions would be equal to 0.799 (the highest value and statistically significant 
at 1%). Derived from column 1, when developed regions had HH regions as 
their neighbors, their economies were pushed toward further growth. Thus, 
developed regions were expected to be clustered and become richer because 
of the neighboring effect. With HL regions as their neighbors, the regional 
income growth showed the lowest value compared with other cases. With 
regards the variables of industrial structures, when developed regions had LL 
regions as their neighbors, the coefficients of manufacturing sector and 
industrial diversity were found to be negative and insignificant; thus, they did 
not contribute to the regional income growth. This explained why there were 
no backward linkages in the case of a developed region neighbored by the less 
developed region. In all cases, the parameters for population size showed the 
same signs as those shown in Table 3.2 and Table 3.4. In considering regional 
government tax revenue, a significant and positive effect (column 1 and 
column 3) was derived from cases where regions had HH or LH regions as 
their neighbors; this was presented by employing GRP level, which affected 
the regional income growth positively. It was expected that more tax revenue 
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would be needed due to the higher economic growth caused by the 
neighboring effect. Compared with the coefficient of the GRP level, the 
developed regions had more advantages given that these developed regions 
were neighbored by specific group (i.e., developed or less developed regions).  
The results of estimating the GRP differential with the neighboring effect 
for the developed regions are shown in Table 3.5. For all cases, the 
coefficients of the GRP differentials showed a significant and positive sign. 
Results showed the same trends as those observed with the GRP level. It was 
shown in column 1, where GRP differentials were employed, that if the 
neighboring HH regions would grow more, this would continue and be 
reflected in the regional income growth of the developed regions. In column 4, 
were the GRP differentials are employed, the increased disparities between 
the developed regions and the neighboring less developed regions resulted in 
a more induced regional income growth for the former. This might intensify 
the gap between –the two regions; thus, the developed regions were expected 
to be clustered and become richer. The other independent variables, such as 
industrial structures, regional tax revenue and population, presented the same 














Table 3.5 Estimation of Asymmetric Regional Income Model with Neighboring Effect 
by Four Cases of Developed Regions  
 










Intercept -17.012*** -4.021*** 15.485*** -461.273*** 
Log (Capital) 0.131*** 0.003*** 0.229*** 0.076*** 
Log (Regular employees) 0.801*** 0.503*** 0.728*** 0.798*** 
Log (Temporary employees) 0.068*** 0.494*** 0.042*** 0.126*** 
Log (Regional government tax 
revenue) 
0.216*** -0.290*** 0.476*** 0.151*** 
Log (Population size) 3.803*** 4.447*** -2.596*** 70.468*** 
Log (Population size) 2 -0.191*** -0.195*** 0.082*** -2.746*** 
Log (Degree of concentration in 
Manufacturing Sector) 
-0.417*** 0.243*** 0.084*** -0.570*** 
Log (Industrial diversity) 0.143*** -0.145*** 0.130*** -0.258*** 
Asymmetric Economic Growth Factor  
(Growing Less than National Average=1) 
-0.042*** 0.035*** -0.038*** -0.023*** 
Log (GRP Level of Neighboring HH Regions) 0.349***  
 
 





Log (GRP Level of Neighboring LH Regions) 
 
 0.253***  





F-value 82.78*** 19.51*** 114.29*** 280.19*** 
Adj R-Sq 76.19 60.45 94.97 98.74 
Number of Observations 252 120 60 48 
Note: *, **, and *** mean statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 










Intercept 3.843*** 4.531*** -5.984*** 51.774*** 
Log (Capital) 0.141*** 0.050*** 0.257*** 0.175*** 
Log (Regular employees) 0.510*** 0.296*** 0.684*** 0.720*** 
Log (Temporary employees) 0.348*** 0.654*** 0.059*** 0.104*** 
Log (Regional government tax 
revenue) 
0.156*** -0.439*** 0.435*** 0.232*** 
Log (Population size) 2.409*** 4.377*** 1.749*** -4.355*** 
Log (Population size) 2 -0.135*** -0.185*** -0.084*** 0.142*** 
Log (Degree of concentration in 
Manufacturing Sector) 
-0.408*** 0.150*** 0.141*** 0.009*** 
Log (Industrial diversity) 0.128*** -0.141*** -0.079*** -0.005*** 
Asymmetric Economic Growth Factor  
(Growing Less than National Average=1) 
-0.012*** 0.063*** -0.019*** -0.036*** 
Log (GRP Differentials between Own 




Log (GRP Differentials between Own 




Log (GRP Differentials between Own 
Region and Each Neighboring LH Region)  
 0.005***  
Log (GRP Differentials between Own 




F-value 123.91*** 38.15*** 94.38*** 365.63*** 
Adj R-Sq 82.79 75.41 93.96 98.71 
Number of Observations 252 120 60 48 
Note: *, **, and *** mean statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3.6 reports the results of estimating the GRP level and the GRP 
differentials with the neighboring effect for less developed regions 
categorized into four cases. In column 1, where GRP level was employed, if 
the less developed regions would be neighbored by the developed regions, the 
regional economies of the former would show the highest growth. This would 
be related to the pull effect of the adjacent developed regions. The rapid 
growing regions, such as the neighboring LH regions, show higher 
neighboring effect than the coefficient of the GRP level as the neighboring 
effect shown in Table 3.4. However, neighbored by HL regions, the regional 
economic growth showed insignificant value. The neighboring effect, in a 
case where regions were neighbored by less developed regions, was found to 
be the same as the neighboring effect in Table 3.4. This implied that the 
neighboring effect must be considered more as a development plan of the 
neighboring regions for the regional economic growth of the less developed 
regions. In all cases, regional tax revenue affected economies of the less 
developed regions negatively. Moreover, the reinforcement of the 
manufacturing sector was more important as in previous results shown in 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.4.  
The results in estimating the GRP differential with the neighboring effect 
for the less developed regions are shown in Table 3.6. For all cases among 
less developed regions, the GRP differential affected the regional economic 
growth negatively. The greater the disparity between the neighboring 
developed regions and the less developed regions, the more it hindered the 
regional economic growth of the latter, especially by employing GRP 
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differentials. As a result, the less developed regions could not catch up with 
the developed regions. Finally, the gap between the regions would repeatedly 
be intensified. If the disparity between the neighboring regions and the less 
developed regions can be reduced, then the regional income growth of the 
latter regions can be expected to grow.  
The developed regions were expected to be clustered and become richer by 
means of the neighboring effects (i.e., the GRP level and the GRP differential). 
The developed regions would gain more advantage if they had specific groups, 
such as the developed or the less developed regions, as their neighbors. The 
neighboring developed regions pulled the regional income growth of the less 
developed regions more. The greater the disparity between the neighboring 
developed and less developed regions, the more it hindered the regional 
income growth of the latter. As a result, the gap between the two regions 
would repeatedly be intensified. If the disparity between the neighboring 
regions and the less developed regions would be reduced, the regional 
economies of the latter can be expected to grow. Moreover, the reinforcement 
of manufacturing sector was more important for the regional income growth 














Table 3.6 Estimation of Asymmetric Regional Income Model with Neighboring 
Effect by Four Cases of Less-Developed Regions  
 










Intercept 42.862*** 67.290*** 28.712*** 28.327*** 
Log (Capital) 0.301*** 0.069*** 0.232*** 0.190*** 
Log (Regular employees) 0.593*** 0.693*** 0.585*** 0.510*** 
Log (Temporary employees) 0.106*** 0.238*** 0.183*** 0.299*** 
Log (Regional government tax 
revenue) 
-0.263*** 0.059*** -0.327*** -0.307*** 
Log (Population size) -5.697*** -8.136*** -1.733*** -1.277*** 
Log (Population size) 2 0.204*** 0.319*** 0.067*** 0.045*** 
Log (Degree of concentration in 
Manufacturing Sector) 
0.298*** 0.296*** 0.219*** 0.390*** 
Log (Industrial diversity) -0.289*** 0.280*** -0.213*** -0.082*** 
Asymmetric Economic Growth Factor  
(Growing Less than National Average=1) 
-0.023*** -0.026*** -0.034*** -0.045*** 
Log (GRP Level of Neighboring HH Regions) 0.544***  
 
 





Log (GRP Level of Neighboring LH Regions) 
 
 0.189***  





F-value 128.85*** 239.67*** 60.73*** 285.18*** 
Adj R-Sq 97.29 96.11 71.05 81.54 
Number of Observations 36 96 240 672 
Note: *, **, and *** mean statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 










Intercept 53.367*** 68.057*** 36.186*** 33.183*** 
Log (Capital) 0.300*** 0.070*** 0.238*** 0.193*** 
Log (Regular employees) 0.598*** 0.688*** 0.537*** 0.544*** 
Log (Temporary employees) 0.102*** 0.242*** 0.224*** 0.264*** 
Log (Regional government tax 
revenue) 
-0.257*** 0.062*** -0.288*** -0.281*** 
Log (Population size) -4.963*** -8.155*** -2.257*** -1.553*** 
Log (Population size) 2 0.177*** 0.320*** 0.089*** 0.057*** 
Log (Degree of concentration in 
Manufacturing Sector) 
0.340*** 0.297*** 0.231*** 0.412*** 
Log (Industrial diversity) -0.204*** 0.281*** -0.166*** -0.096*** 
Asymmetric Economic Growth Factor  
(Growing Less than National Average=1) 
-0.029*** -0.026*** -0.037*** -0.049*** 
Log (GRP Differentials between Own 




Log (GRP Differentials between Own 




Log (GRP Differentials between Own 
Region and Each Neighboring LH Region)  
 -0.005***  
Log (GRP Differentials between Own 




F-value 120.52*** 239.55*** 57.06*** 299.08*** 
Adj R-Sq 97.11 96.11 69.73 81.47 
Number of Observations 36 96 240 672 
Note: *, **, and *** mean statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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The analysis of neighboring effects was extended from the developed and 
less developed regions, considering the total regions in Korea. Table 3.7 
presents the results of the estimation of the neighboring effects for the 224 
regions in Korea. As can be seen, there were positive neighboring effects in 
the GRP level. The GRP differential values were 0.269 and 0.002 as shown in 
columns 1 and 2, respectively. These implied that the regional income level of 
neighboring regions was more important for the regional income growth. 
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 present the results of estimating the neighboring 
effects for the 224 regions in Korea categorized into four cases. In addition, 
the number of regions neighbored with HH regions had 38 cases, in which the 
neighboring effect value was found to be the highest (shown in column 1 of 
Table 3.8). However, in column 4 the regions neighbored with LL regions had 
the lowest neighboring effect. Finally, more prosperous neighboring regions 
had a more positive influence on the regional economic performance.  
 
Table 3.7 Estimation of the Neighboring Effects for 224 Regions in Korea 
Neighboring Effects Descriptions GRP Level GRP Differentials 
Intercept 28.077*** 32.664*** 
Log (Capital) 0.120*** 0.059*** 
Log (Regular employees) 0.558*** 0.606*** 
Log (Temporary employees) 0.322*** 0.335*** 
Log (Regional government tax revenue) -0.236*** -0.127*** 
Log (Population size) -1.872*** -1.573*** 
Log (Population size) 2 0.068*** 0.053*** 
Log (Degree of concentration in 
Manufacturing Sector) 
0.213*** 0.321*** 
Log (Industrial diversity) 0.064*** 0.070*** 
Asymmetric Economic Growth Factor 
(Growing Less than National Average=1) 
-0.020*** -0.028*** 
Log (GRP Level of Neighboring Regions) 0.269***  
Log (GRP Differentials between Own 
Region and Each Neighboring Region)  
0.002*** 
F-value 1534.26*** 1438.12*** 
Adj R-Sq 85.16 84.03 
Note: *, **, and *** mean statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3.8 Estimation of Asymmetric Regional Income Model with the GRP level 










Intercept -13.593*** 31.356*** 17.974*** 35.004*** 
Log (Capital) 0.088*** 0.060*** 0.212*** 0.208*** 
Log (Regular employees) 0.705*** 0.650*** 0.428*** 0.514*** 
Log (Temporary employees) 0.207*** 0.290*** 0.360*** 0.278*** 
Log (Regional government tax 
revenue) 
-0.271*** -0.256*** -0.166*** -0.217*** 
Log (Population size) 4.145*** -3.459*** -0.308*** -2.505*** 
Log (Population size) 2 -0.177*** 0.141*** -0.006*** 0.093*** 
Log (Degree of concentration in 
Manufacturing Sector) 
-0.042*** 0.246*** 0.071*** 0.304*** 
Log (Industrial diversity) -0.048*** -0.191*** 0.165*** 0.010*** 
Asymmetric Economic Growth Factor  
(Growing Less than National Average=1) 
0.003*** 0.040*** -0.067*** -0.013*** 
Log (GRP Level of Neighboring HH Regions) 0.468***  
 
 





Log (GRP Level of Neighboring LH Regions) 
 
 0.224***  





F-value 208.94*** 170.84*** 361.01*** 1060.55*** 
Adj R-Sq 81.78 76.83 85.02 90.91 
Number of Regions 38 42 52 92 
Note: *, **, and *** mean statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 3.9 Estimation of Asymmetric Regional Income Model with the GRP 










Intercept 2.160*** 47.940*** 23.885*** 32.242*** 
Log (Capital) 0.095*** 0.052*** 0.189*** 0.176*** 
Log (Regular employees) 0.376*** 0.431*** 0.430*** 0.544*** 
Log (Temporary employees) 0.529*** 0.516*** 0.381*** 0.280*** 
Log (Regional government tax 
revenue) 
-0.199*** -0.223*** -0.068*** -0.228*** 
Log (Population size) 3.746*** -3.732*** -0.476*** -1.434*** 
Log (Population size) 2 -0.166*** 0.147*** -0.002*** 0.047*** 
Log (Degree of concentration in 
Manufacturing Sector) 
-0.061*** 0.256*** 0.132*** 0.307*** 
Log (Industrial diversity) 0.024*** -0.056*** 0.195*** 0.018*** 
Asymmetric Economic Growth Factor  
(Growing Less than National Average=1) 
0.009*** 0.077*** -0.069*** -0.017*** 
Log (GRP Differentials between Own 




Log (GRP Differentials between Own 




Log (GRP Differentials between Own 
Region and Each Neighboring LH Region)  
 0.001***  
Log (GRP Differentials between Own 




F-value 207.38*** 153.07*** 334.98*** 1247.70*** 
Adj R-Sq 81.67 74.80 84.04 91.85 
Number of Regions 38 42 52 92 
Note: *, **, and *** mean statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3.9 presents the GRP differentials with the neighboring effects for 
each case in the 224 regions. As shown in column 1, if the neighboring HH 
regions would grow more, these neighboring effects would positively affect 
the neighbored regional income growth, proving that developed regions 
expected to be clustered and become richer. 
To conclude, the regions in Korea would be more clustered based on the 
level of development through the neighboring effects (more development in 
the GRP level). Based on the result, more prosperous regions were needed in 
the neighborhoods to facilitate regional income growth. Table 3.10 
summarizes the policy and market factors for the regional income growth 
from the estimation results. 
 
Table 3.10 Sources for the Regional Income Growth of Total 224 Regions in 
Korea 
Description Economic Sources 
Policy Factor 
· Capital accumulation and investment 
· Expediting industrial diversity 
· Easing the regional tax burden 
· Reinforcing manufacturing sector 
· Increasing population as urbanization economies 
Market Factor 
· The developed level of the neighboring regions, especially the 
neighboring HH and HL regions 
· The lower disparity between the less-developed regions and  
the developed regions 
 
3.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
This study was aimed at analyzing the economic growth patterns of the less 
developed regions and identifying the reasons why the less developed regions 
continuously show low income growth. The results showed that there were 
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regions that remained as less developed for a long time, which can be 
considered as structured. The less developed regions recorded a low average 
regional income levels from 1998 to 2009 and even lower regional income 
growth rates in 2009 against 1998 compared with the national average. The 
less developed regions were mostly concentrated in the Eastern and South-
Western areas of Seoul, Korea. Most of the less developed regions grew less 
during the recovery periods compared with the developed regions. 
Consequently, there was an asymmetric regional income growth structure 
among the less developed regions that significantly hindered the regional 
income growth; specifically, the structural factor caused the low income 
growth among less developed regions. The developed regions were expected 
to be clustered and become richer by means of the neighboring effect. The 
neighboring developed regions pulled most of the regional income growth of 
the less developed regions. The greater the disparity between the neighboring 
developed regions and the less developed regions the more it hindered the 
regional income growth of the latter. Reducing the disparity between the 
neighboring regions and the less developed regions would result in the growth 
of the regional economies of the latter. 
From a viewpoint of the neighboring effect, urban integration would be 
needed not between the developed regions and the adjacent developed regions 
but between less developed regions and its neighboring developed regions. 
This could achieve a balanced regional development through the regional 
income growth of the less developed regions. The World Bank (2009) has 
already pointed out the integration between rural and urban areas, between 
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slums and parts of cities, and between lagging and leading provinces within a 
nation. However, it would be inappropriate to integrate between the over-
crowing developed regions as explained in the results presented in Table 3.3. 
A general overhaul of the administrative system has been going on in Korea. 
This has been implemented in the integration and the reorganization of 
municipalities. Finally, the results on the neighboring effects, the effects of 
industrial structures, and population are very important to the present 
discussion. Moreover, the empirical results of concentration in manufacturing 
sector, as seen from Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, suggest that the relocation of 
manufacturing facilities among regions may be required. 
There were some limitations in gathering the regional data, and these 
limitations restricted some of the analyses in the current study due to the time 
period considered. If the study considered a longer time period, asymmetric 
variables representing the business cycle could be designed. In future studies, 
a spatial weighted matrix, such as discussing the accessibility based on 
railroad or road network beyond the contiguity, could be considered to extend 
the scope of the analysis. Moreover, the neighboring effect could be studied 
dynamically with the inclusion of a time variable. Manufacturing and service 
sectors could also be classified in a more detailed manner because energy, 
information and communication, and cultural industry have become important 
aspects included in the analysis. Finally, the change of the labor structure 





Contribution of Financial Incentives of Local 




Korea has experienced two large financial crises in the last 10 years, that is, 
in 1997 and 2008. In the midst of these big shocks, bank- and market-based 
financial markets experienced structural changes such as merger and 
acquisition, liquidity crisis, and financial hemorrhage caused by uncollectible 
accounts from bankruptcy. Furthermore, many firms continue to experience 
an ongoing-restructuring process and a readjustment of bonds and debts 
through Non-Performing Loan Disposal Fund and Structural Regulation 
Fund
31
 by the Korea Asset Management Company. In the public sector, the 
local government has established credit guarantee funds since 2000. The 
institutions administering these funds play a role in credit guarantee schemes, 
such as loans for intra-regional firms, which contribute to financing.  
These experiences have reinforced the relationship between firms and 
regional economic growth. In 1934, Schumpeter stressed the role played by 
entrepreneurship in the development and spread of innovation (Minniti, 2008). 
A significant amount of literature also established the important social 
implications of entrepreneurial activity (Chell, 2007). For example, 
                                           
31  In 1997 the government established the Corporate Restructuring Committee and 
accomplished corporate restructuring emergency funding. In 2008, the Coordinating Committee 
of Creditor Financial Institutions was launched to advance the restructuring process. 
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entrepreneurs (both social and economic) typically garner alienable resources 
consciously through networking and other processes, and use their personal or 
human capital to achieve their espoused mission of wealth and social value 
creation. Local and central governments establish and execute financing, 
taxation, budgetary adjustments for early public finance expenditure, 
assistance for innovation activities, and regulations or encouragement on 
industrial policies. Moreover, the role of finance in economic growth 
increased at the local and national levels during the last two financial crises. 
Financial sectors can be evaluated in two ways. First is through the 
importance of their role in economic growth. Whether financial sectors are 
overemphasized or affect economic growth negatively, or promote 
technological innovation and economic growth by facilitating capital 
accumulation and industrial investment is debatable. The second is through 
the relation between direct and indirect financial markets. Are these two 
complementary or substitutes? Which contributes more to achieving economic 
growth? In other words, is the bank-based financial system or market-based 
financial system more helpful to financing and economic growth issues 
because of their comparative advantage and efficiency? These two issues have 
been studied for a long time at the regional and national levels. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the factors that affect the output 
growth of firms in financial sectors considering the role of local government 
as a regional policy-making body. The financial sectors include bank-based 
and market-based financial systems. Previous studies focused on the role 
played by the financial sector in national or regional economic growth. 
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However, this paper explores how the financial resources generated by either 
financial system contribute to the output growth of firms through productive 
channels and how the output growth of firms depends on the disparity among 
financial tools of local government as regional government policies. Finally, 
this study presents policy implications to improve the efficiency of financial 
sectors and of financial tools as regional government policies. This study 
employed micro firm-level data and regional macro data from 1997 to 2009 
that were sourced from the National Information and Credit Evaluation Inc. 
(NICE) and Statistics Korea. Multi-level statistical methods were used. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, previous literature is discussed, 
mostly on the relationship between financial sectors and financial tools and 
regional economic growth. Next, multi-level statistical models are estimated 
considering the endogenous economic growth theory. Finally, the conclusion 
and policy implications are presented. 
 
4.2 Financial Sectors and Regional Economic Growth 
 
Financial sectors and regional development 
In terms of the regional financial market, Beare (1976) contributed first to 
the development of the monetary theory at the regional level. National money 
is important in determining regional income, with the differential regional 
impacts explained by the regional differences in income or wealth elasticity of 
demand for regional output. Moore et al. (1985) developed a regional 
monetary multiplier based on the proportion of loanable funds invested in the 
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region rather than outside it, assuming that the money supply of the region is 
managed by regional banks. For example, a fixed supply of real money 
balances is assumed. Money supply is an exogenous policy variable by a 
regional financial market or system because a larger supply of money or 
finance increases regional aggregate demand. This work finally identified the 
mutual interaction between income and credit. Amos and Wingender (1993) 
considered the contribution of regional financial activity to regional growth 
based on the work of Moore et al. (1985) that considers an extended model of 
regional financial markets. Thus, this analysis provides a basis for 
determining the importance of regionally segmented financial markets to 
regional growth. Analysis of the results shows that unbalanced regional 
economic growth occurs within a nation because the effect and the role of the 
financial market on regional economic growth differ according to regional 
conditions. Generally, the availability of more regional credit induces regional 
output growth. Koo (1996) studied the relationship between regional financial 
market and regional economic growth. He focused on how regional economic 
growth would differ based on regional financing conditions. In his study, 
regions with active granting of credit within a region show high economic 
growth rate because of access to a financial market at the national level. Choi 
and Cho (2001) assumed a separate regional financial sector and analyzed the 
correlation between such sector and regional economic growth in a particular 
region in Korea. Results from metropolitan cities indicate that the regional 
financial market leads regional economic growth caused by the imbalance in 
the regional development of the financial sectors. Guiso et al. (2004) studied 
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the effects of the differences in the local financial development within an 
integrated financial market. They found that financial development enhances 
the probability of start-up businesses, favors the entry of new firms, increases 
competition, and promotes growth and that these effects are weaker for large 
firms. Large firms can more easily raise funds outside the local area. In Italy, 
local financial development is generally an important determinant of the 
regional economic success when no frictions to capital movements exist 
within an integrated financial market. However, the analyses of Carbo 
Valverde and Rodriguez Fernandez (2004) showed that bank concentration 
does not have a significant impact on the economies of the 17 Spanish regions 
from a panel analysis. A panel granger causality test showed that each 
financial sector did not advance regional economic growth. This finding is 
caused by regions having a more accurate definition of the relevant retail bank 
market and all kinds of institutional, legal, and cultural differences that can be 
held constant at the regional level. 
 
Contribution of financial sectors to economic growth 
With regard to the contribution of financial sectors to economic growth, a 
number of empirical academic debates have been conducted on the 
relationship between these two. One argument is that the role of financial 
sectors in economic growth is overemphasized, and the other is that the role of 
financial sectors is more important in economic growth. These arguments can 
be represented by the question of which between monetary and fiscal policy is 
more effective. Lucas (1988) pointed out that economists have 
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overemphasized the role of financial sectors in economic growth. 
Chandavarkar (1992) insisted that the financial market has a negative overall 
impact on economic growth based on his review of previous studies on 
developing countries, which are related to the competitiveness and autonomy 
of oligopolistic financial systems owned and managed by the government. 
Docherty (2011) found that the monetary policy is ineffective based on 
Keynes’ General Theories because of the liquidity trap. In this case, the rate of 
interest may have fallen to such a low level that the demand for money 
becomes absolute and the liquidity preference function effectively becomes 
horizontal. Classical theories emphasize the monetary policy, assuming no 
change in the demand of money. The Schumpeterian view stresses that 
financial services are essential elements in technological innovation and 
economic growth, and that the development of financial markets promote 
economic growth through the improved quality and quantity of credit 
provision. Hicks (1969) studied how the financial system promotes capital 
accumulation through various channels and contributes to economic growth 
under the industrial revolution periods in the United Kingdom. King and 
Levine (1993a, 1993b) proved that the correlation between financial sector 
and economic growth is strong in fast growing countries after analyzing 80 
countries in the period of 1960 to 1989. Such result is possibly caused by the 
financial sector fostering investment and increasing the financial wealth of 
firms and households towards capital market activity. Hassan et al. (2011) 
concluded that domestic credit provided by the banking and private sectors 
and money supply have the largest impact on economic growth in the East 
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Asia and Pacific regions based on the analysis of the neo-classical growth 
model. This impact is related to higher growth rate and finance because of the 
increasing demand for financial services. Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) 
showed the inflation threshold from panel regression for 84 countries from 
1960 to 1995. The inflation threshold for the finance–growth relationship is 
between 13% and 25%. When inflation exceeds the threshold, finance ceases 
to increase economic growth. In examining a panel of 74 countries, Rioja and 
Valey (2004) found that, in the low region (countries with low levels of 
financial development), additional improvements in financial markets have an 
uncertain effect on growth; in the intermediate region, financial development 
has a large, positive effect on growth; in the high region, the effect is positive 
but smaller. However, in his analysis of 57 countries from 1967 to 2001, Fung 
(2009) showed that financial development most positively affects the national 
economies of low-income countries. Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) concluded 
that the relationship between finance and growth is unstable based on recent 
data reexamining the core cross-country panel results. For example, the 
deepening of financing in a banking system has a strong effect on growth as 
long as the country avoids a financial crisis. The role of equity markets was 
not available for all the countries in the samples. 
 
Financial and fiscal policies 
Local government policies related to the overall output growth of firms can 
be divided into three types: financial offering, taxation and public finance 
expenditure as fiscal policies, and industrial policy. Many attempts have been 
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made to create policies that enhance finance offering to firms (Harrison et al., 
2004). Local and central government have tried to reduce financial constraints 
faced by firms, especially venture and small- and medium-sized firms. They 
have employed diverse financial tools such as mutual funds, credit assistance, 
credit guarantee, venture capital, interest subsidies, and various investment 
funds. Empirical evidence reveals mixed results on the effectiveness of 
financing offerings. Li (2002) showed that current credit assistance programs 
in the form of interest subsidies exert strong effects on the allocation of credit 
to targeted entrepreneurs that enhances the liquidity of agents, but they come 
at the cost of non-targeted entrepreneurs. A general equilibrium analysis 
showed reduced total entrepreneurial activities and large output losses. In 
analyzing 280 Australian venture capital and private equity fund investments 
in the period of 1982 to 2005, Cumming (2007) found that the Australian 
Innovation Investment Fund government program facilitated investment in 
start-up, early-stage, and high-tech firms and in cost-effective monitoring, and 
fostered the development of the Australian venture capital industry. Kreft and 
Sobel (2005) studied whether development efforts to bring in venture funds 
are better than encouraging more entrepreneurial activity by enacting policy 
reform that expands economic freedom. Their conclusion stresses that 
economic development policies should focus on creating an environment 
attractive to individual entrepreneurs rather than to venture capital. Fiscal 
policies such as taxation system, and local and central government 
expenditure can be favorable to firms or discourage entrepreneurship. 
According to Bruce and Mohsin (2006), top income and capital gains tax rates 
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exert negative but quantitatively small influences on entrepreneurship from 
regression analysis. This finding indicates that tax policies are not good 
instruments for generating changes at the level of entrepreneurial activity. 
Takii (2008) argued that, as government expenditure could not reflect changes 
in consumer tastes, expansionary fiscal policy weakens the social role of firms’ 
activities to predict and adapt to idiosyncratic changes in consumer taste. 
Chen and Groenewold (2011) found that interior local government fiscal 
policies such as increasing government expenditure could widen the inter-
regional gap in terms of income and output per capita. However, Jacobides et 
al. (2006) pointed out that direct subsidies for R&D and support for linkages 
between universities and the private sector are effective in encouraging 
innovation.   
 
Bank-based and market-based financial system 
The debate on the comparative advantage between a bank-based financial 
system and a market-based financial system originated from the perspective of 
Gershenkron (1962) on financial structures. However, studies on this debate 
only began to be conducted in the early 1980s. Three issues exist regarding 
this matter, namely, the comparative advantage of a market-based system, the 
dominant position of a bank-based system, and the complementary 
relationship between two financial systems. After the secular recession in the 
Japanese economy and the regression in the German economy in the 1990s, 
the financial market moved from a bank-based financial system to a market-
based financial system. Rajan and Zingales (1998) insisted that the bank-
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based financial system could produce inefficiency in the allocation of funds 
because it entails oblique dealings. For example, the financial crisis in East 
Asia in 1997 was attributed to the inefficient allocation of resources. Koo 
(2007) suggested that, as banks grow larger, the allocation of funds becomes 
more inefficient. Such inefficiency is caused by the decreasing efficiency in 
financial intermediation. He also evaluated that the profit-oriented 
management of banks weakens long-term financing and investment in small- 
and medium-sized companies in Korea. However, he pointed out that the 
competition between bank-based and market-based financial systems has 
alleviated as a result of the role of banks as a source of investment funds for 
market-based financial market based on abundant liquidity. The bank-based 
financial system has comparative advantages in information gathering, 
relationship with companies, reduction of fund-raising expense through 
economies of scales in financing, and liquidity management. Such system 
focuses on financial intermediation through information gathering and 
valuation of companies. Becketti and Morris (1992) and Hooks and Opler 
(1993) emphasized the role of banking sectors in the growth of small- and 
medium-sized companies despite the development of a market-based financial 
system. They pointed out that the declining effect of banks is temporary. 
Chant (1992) argued that the role of the banks is still important because even 
large companies prefer financing from banks to avoid special information 
disclosure. Schmidt et al. (1999) found that banks could persistently hold an 
important role by emphasizing the supply of short-term loans. According to 
Carbo Valverde and Rodriguez Fernandez (2004), market-based finance such 
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as mutual funds has a negative effect on Spanish regional economies. Such 
effect can be explained by the investment of mutual funds in large, highly 
concentrated financial markets in which securities, shares, and government 
bonds of large international and national corporations are mainly traded. As a 
result, they are rarely invested in the regions where they are captured. 
However, in analyzing the financial sectors in 45 countries from 1980 to 1995, 
Levine (2002) estimated that a better developed financial system between 
bank-based and market-based financial systems induces economic growth. 
Beck and Levine (2001) revealed that banks and stock markets are mutually 
complementary, thus jointly contributing to economic growth. Park et al. 
(2006) argued that a developed market-based financial system attenuates the 
intermediation functioning of a bank-based financial system because a 
market-based financial system is superior to the other with respect to 
efficiency in the allocation of resources.
32
 Nevertheless, they suggested a 
mutual complementary relationship between market-based and bank-based 
financial systems based on the important role played by the bank-based 
financial system in small- and medium-sized companies. 
 
Summary  
The relationship between finance and economic growth in countries or 
regions may vary empirically across analyzed countries, regions, or economic 
environment. Moreover, such relationship changes over time. The policies of 
local and central governments are crucial as financial tools and fiscal policies 
                                           
32 Porter (1992), Franks and Mayer (1993), and Boyd and Gertler (1994) insisted the same. 
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to the entrepreneurial activities and the output growth of firms. However, 
mixed results were obtained on the effectiveness of each policy. Given better 
economic growth and more developed financial sectors, financial sectors 
induce economic growth more positively based on the complementary 






This research employed micro firm-level data from KIS-VALUE. KIS-
VALUE provides analysis data, which are supplied by NICE, for each firm in 
Korea. A total of 3,045 firms that existed sustainably from 1997 to 2009 were 
analyzed. In relation to the financial sectors, the amount of bond issues and 
the amount of paid-in-capital increase were represented for the market-based 
financial sector, and the amount of short-term loans and the amount of long-
term loans were utilized in the bank-based financial sector. The financial tools 
of local governments used were the credit guarantee amounts from each local 
government. Fiscal policies were classified as either local government 
expenditures or local tax revenue. The total expenditures of each local 
government were divided into investment expenditures and non-investment 
expenditures. Locations were divided into two regions, namely, the Seoul 
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Metropolitan Area (SMA) and the Rest of Korea (ROK).
33
 Firms were 
classified into two based on their size: large firms and small- and medium-
sized firms.
34
 The industry sectors with which each firm is affiliated were 
grouped into manufacturing, service, construction, and electric power sectors. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary for Firms’ Data  















Firms Construction 39 
 






Electric Power 3 
  






















Sized Service 477 
 
Sized Service 159 
 
Firms Manufacturing 826 
 
Firms Manufacturing 690 
 
Table 4.1 shows data by region, firm size, and industrial sectors. Data 
differed in terms of indirect or direct financing based on bank-based or 
market-based financial systems by region, by industries within a region, by 
firm sizes within a region, and by firm sizes and industries within a region. 
Restrictions in indirect or direct financing between regions result in financing 
constraints for each firm in each region. The analysis of data on indirect or 
direct financing is summarized in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.  
Table 4.2 describes the relative share of the number of firms experienced in 
financing resources such as bonds, paid-in capital increases, short-term loans, 
and long-term loans. Firms located in SMA showed a generally decreasing 
trend in financing through bond issues after the financial crisis in 1997 
                                           
33 The Seoul Metropolitan Area is composed of Seoul, Incheon, and the Kyounggi region 
among 16 metropolitan regions, and is represented as SMA. The Rest of Korea excludes SMA. 
34 In Korea, small- and medium-sized firms are defined in the Minor Enterprises Act.  
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(columns 1 to 3), but these firms could issue bonds more easily than firms 
located in ROK. Considering the sizes of the firms, large firms generally had 
better opportunities to issue bonds than did small and medium firms in all 
regions. Thus, small and medium firms were inferior to large firms in terms of 
management performance and internal reserves. In the case of industrial 
sectors, large firms showed high bond issues in construction and electric 
power sectors, and small and medium firms presented higher bond issues in 
the manufacturing sector than in other industrial sectors. Columns 4 to 6 show 
that only a few firms in each region could be financed by paid-in-capital 
increase. However, a large number of firms were heavily dependent on short-
term and long-term loans in each region (columns 7 to 12). These firms had 
considerable financing constraints through the direct financial market 
(market-based financial system). Moreover, firms in ROK depended more on 
bank-based financing resources. The difference in long-term loans between 
regions was more significant than that in short-term loans even though the 




















Table 4.2 Relative Share of Number of Firms by Financing Resources: Bond, 
































Total 19.5  16.8  17.4  0.0  1.3  3.9  81.4  74.0  72.7  72.0  58.6  52.8  
Large 
Firms 
Sub Total 43.2  35.0  32.6  0.0  2.5  5.6  82.7  70.6  64.9  78.4  63.8  55.7  
Construction 57.1  52.6  67.2  0.0  5.8  10.8  94.9  69.2  74.9  84.0  79.5  80.0  
Service 30.8  27.1  24.5  0.0  2.5  5.2  72.5  63.3  50.5  59.6  44.3  37.7  
Electric Power 66.7  66.7  93.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  75.0  50.0  80.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  






Sub Total 10.9  10.1  11.8  0.0  0.9  3.3  80.9  75.2  75.5  69.7  56.7  51.7  
Construction 9.1  5.6  5.5  0.0  0.0  1.0  84.6  65.4  70.3  53.3  45.2  49.9  
Service 8.6  9.5  9.9  0.0  0.9  3.5  72.0  66.6  64.5  47.1  35.5  33.5  
Manufacturing 12.4  11.0  13.7  0.0  1.0  3.4  85.7  81.4  82.4  84.7  70.4  62.4  
ROK 
Total 13.3  11.2  12.2  0.0  0.7  2.6  85.4  79.4  79.2  81.8  71.8  65.6  
Large 
Firms 
Sub Total 33.9  26.7  25.1  0.0  2.1  3.9  80.4  69.5  67.3  79.6  66.2  53.2  
Construction 58.3  66.7  60.0  0.0  12.5  6.7  75.0  62.5  60.0  70.8  66.7  73.3  
Service 23.1  15.1  10.2  0.0  0.9  3.4  60.4  53.8  51.7  47.6  42.0  32.5  
Electric Power 66.7  50.0  13.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  75.0  58.3  6.7  100.0  100.0  80.0  






Sub Total 9.0  8.0  9.6  0.0  0.4  2.3  86.4  81.4  81.7  82.3  72.9  68.2  
Construction 7.8  3.6  4.7  0.0  0.0  0.7  79.4  69.4  68.9  65.0  55.0  50.4  
Service 5.8  6.8  7.0  0.0  0.2  2.3  80.5  76.9  75.6  59.1  50.9  52.7  
Manufacturing 9.9  8.8  10.8  0.0  0.5  2.6  88.7  84.1  84.7  89.9  80.3  74.1  





Table 4.3 Relative Share of Financing Amount by Financing Resources: Bond, 
































Total 16.0  12.8  12.6  0.0  3.5  1.6  12.8  8.8  8.5  9.8  5.5  5.9  
Large 
Firms 
Sub Total 16.2  12.9  12.6  0.0  3.2  1.1  12.2  7.9  7.0  9.6  5.3  5.7  
Construction 20.6  9.9  10.6  0.0  3.4  0.6  23.9  4.5  6.0  11.2  3.7  3.0  
Service 7.4  13.4  15.4  0.0  3.5  0.7  8.2  6.7  5.5  3.1  3.5  5.7  
Electric Power 74.8  34.6  33.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  11.8  7.4  5.6  40.3  15.5  8.8  






Sub Total 13.4  9.8  11.8  0.0  5.0  10.8  18.1  15.9  19.4  11.4  7.9  8.8  
Construction 12.4  6.8  7.3  0.0  0.0  7.5  24.7  10.6  16.3  16.8  12.5  16.9  
Service 19.4  13.2  20.9  0.0  11.2  15.5  19.6  16.5  19.0  10.0  8.5  9.8  
Manufacturing 11.2  8.8  9.8  0.0  4.2  9.7  16.5  16.3  19.9  11.2  7.3  7.4  
ROK 
Total 19.8  14.1  10.0  0.0  40.9  3.1  20.3  13.2  12.3  13.3  7.6  4.9  
Large 
Firms 
Sub Total 20.5  14.2  10.3  0.0  26.6  3.3  19.8  11.1  8.5  12.3  6.3  3.2  
Construction 22.1  6.1  22.3  0.0  86.9  1.1  23.7  21.8  11.4  14.4  8.4  10.1  
Service 19.5  15.9  15.2  0.0  0.7  8.3  18.4  13.2  16.3  16.0  5.8  5.1  
Electric Power 39.6  15.4  3.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  36.6  15.1  7.4  45.3  14.4  4.7  






Sub Total 15.5  11.5  7.3  0.0  7.9  4.8  21.1  17.5  20.0  15.7  10.7  9.4  
Construction 12.3  11.7  9.0  0.0  0.0  3.5  29.0  11.2  17.6  21.7  11.2  10.3  
Service 13.7  10.4  14.2  0.0  4.1  6.0  25.5  19.4  19.1  13.2  14.1  15.1  
Manufacturing 16.5  12.0  6.3  0.0  8.5  4.8  18.9  18.1  20.5  15.3  10.1  8.5  




Table 4.3 describes the relative share of the financing amount by financing 
resources to the average sale amount of firms in each financing situation. As 
shown in columns 1 to 3, the firms located in ROK issued a higher amount of 
bonds to the average sale amount of firms in bond issues than did the firms 
located in SMA. Thus, although the absolute number of firms issuing bonds 
was smaller in ROK than in SMA, the issue limit of bonds to the average sale 
amount of firms was larger in ROK. However, considering the firm size, large 
firms had significant advantages over small and medium firms in terms of 
opportunity costs in bond issues in all regions. Columns 4 to 6 show the same 
results as those in Table 4.2. Only a few firms in each region were financed by 
paid-in-capital increase. Based on the amount of short-term loans to the 
average sale amount of firms in columns 7 to 9, firms in ROK were more 
dependent on financing short-term loans. In short, firms in ROK were inferior 
in financing through the direct financial market (market-based financial 
system). 
For regional economic activation, the Act on Regional Credit Guarantee 
Foundation was established in 1999 in Korea. Based on this act, 16 local 
governments
35
 founded their Credit Guarantee Foundation in 2000. 
Aggregated national average credit guarantee amounts per firm decreased 
continuously since 2000 (Table 4.4). Especially in Seoul among SMA regions, 
average credit guarantee amounts per firm dropped by 22.2% in 2000 
according to the 2009 records; this level was the lowest in Korea. Among 
SMA regions, only in Incheon did average credit guarantee amounts per firm 
                                           
35 Korea has 16 metropolitan regions, and each region has a local government.  
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in 2009 increase compared with that at the beginning year of 2000. The North 
Jolla and Jeju regions established the institutions last. The North Jolla, which 
is located in South Seoul, showed the lowest average credit guarantee 
amounts per firm in 2009. The average credit guarantee amounts in ROK 
regions were generally lower than the national average. Thus, firms in ROK 
were inferior in terms of financial credit assistance of local governments to 
firms in SMA, which could cause them financial constraints. Since the 
financial crisis in 2008, credit guarantee amounts of all local governments 
decreased. SMA and ROK showed sharp decreases by (-) 14.5% and (-) 18.6% 
in 2008 and by (-) 13.4% and (-) 13.1% in 2009, respectively. Moreover, the 
national average decreased by (-) 16.4% and (-) 13.4% in 2008 and 2009 
compared with that in the previous year. During the financial crisis, the local 
government significantly reduced its financial offering. This move was 
expected to impede the output growth of firms. 
 
Table 4.4 Average Credit Guarantee Amounts per Firm 
(Unit: Million Won) 




Seoul 73.14 53.75 36.07 27.91 26.02 18.96 19.04 18.21 17.02 16.20 
Incheon 17.79 16.06 16.92 19.75 20.95 22.82 23.66 24.41 20.85 19.18 
Kyounggi 34.74 27.14 25.07 24.86 28.46 34.26 34.44 32.82 25.41 19.13 




Busan 32.42 30.48 30.19 29.95 29.70 28.96 29.19 27.32 20.63 18.42 
Daegu 29.14 27.31 27.39 27.32 27.29 27.13 22.23 21.10 18.82 17.64 
Gwangju 35.69 29.52 29.52 26.56 24.80 22.99 21.34 20.50 16.05 13.83 
Daejeon 23.51 22.95 23.19 22.84 22.95 22.74 21.78 21.83 18.10 14.98 
Ulsan 54.08 43.25 35.65 30.66 30.60 31.29 34.27 32.09 23.45 18.38 
Kangwon 45.01 37.56 32.32 31.07 30.74 31.57 30.26 28.81 19.67 15.85 
Chungbuk 23.39 24.02 23.89 21.84 21.34 20.97 21.01 22.87 19.12 16.37 
Chungnam 53.25 42.15 37.21 33.69 32.00 28.89 27.48 27.69 20.98 18.01 
Jeonbuk - - - 27.85 28.59 23.12 19.62 17.20 14.43 11.34 
Jeonnam - 22.35 21.42 21.93 25.00 23.58 22.33 21.72 17.01 14.63 
Kyoungbuk 45.89 41.88 26.19 22.02 20.62 19.13 19.35 19.61 16.75 16.44 
Kyoungnam 28.71 25.39 24.68 22.02 20.36 20.73 19.96 19.12 17.28 15.96 
Jeju - - - 20.83 22.92 21.47 24.52 25.30 23.71 17.38 
Average 31.42 29.16 28.24 26.70 26.07 25.18 23.81 23.02 18.73 16.27 
National Average 33.86 30.07 27.60 25.88 26.35 25.06 24.53 23.43 19.57 16.95 
Data was aggregated annually, which was supplied by the Small and Medium Business Administrative. 
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As regards local tax revenue, the gap between SMA and ROK widened 1.7 
times in 2009, but little difference was observed in 1997 (Figure 4.1). Figure 
4.2 describes the local government expenditures. The total local government 
expenditures in two regions increased since 1997. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Local Tax Revenue (Unit: Trillion Won) 
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Firms in ROK were inferior in financing through the direct financial market 
(market-based financial system). Moreover, firms in ROK were dependent on 
financing short-term loans. Only a few firms in each region were expected to 
be financed by paid-in-capital increase, which would continue to constrain 
financing for firms in ROK. The average credit guarantee amounts of local 
governments in ROK were generally lower than the national average. Thus, 
firms in ROK were inferior in terms of financial credit assistance of local 





King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) found that financial sectors and human 
capital affect productivity through the production channel. In their empirical 
analysis, Guiso et al. (2004) showed that financial development positively 
affects the creation and the output growth of firms. Thus, this study estimated 
which financial resources financed by each financial system contributed to the 
output growth of firms with financial tools and fiscal policies of local 
governments, respectively. The output growth model of firms was considered, 
including the financial sectors in this study. This aspect was identified as the 
financial productivity that affects the capital productivity and was compared 
with the skilled labor technology that affects labor productivity under the 
endogenous economic growth model. This process ultimately induced the 
increasing returns to scale and the scale of economies by enhancing the capital 
107 
productivity. The basic form of the output growth model of firms including 
financial sectors is expressed as Equation (4.1). 
 
, , , , ,ln ln ln ln ( )i t i t i t i t i tY a L K F             (4.1) 
 
where Y, L, and K represent output, labor, and capital, respectively, of firm i in 
year t. F implies each financial source such as short-term loans, long-term 
loans, bond issues, and paid-in-capital increase. α and β denote labor and 
capital share rate, respectively. γ represents financial productivity. If the 
financial sectors develop the most significantly, the rate of growth in the 
financial productivity will increase and affect the output growth of firms. 
However, this study considered how various financial resources financed by 
each financial system contribute to the output growth of firms through the 
productive channels. Thus, the estimated results of the financial resources 
could be different.  
This study employed multi-level statistical models useful in analyzing 
hierarchical structural data (Goldstein, 2003). For example, firms are the 
Level 1 units clustered within regions, which are the Level 2 units. 
Determinants of the output growth of firms at the micro level can be different 
from the results at the macro level. The dependent variable is the total amount 
of sales of each firm, which indicates the output growth of each firm. The 
total amount of tangible fixed assets and total number of employees were used 
as the capital and labor variables, respectively. The amounts of short-term and 
long-term loans, bond issues, and paid-in-capital increase were included 
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among the independent variables as financial resources. The local credit 
guarantee amounts, local tax revenue, and total expenditures of each local 
government were included as regional macro variables. The total expenditures 
of each local government were divided into investment expenditures and non-
investment expenditures. These variables affect the output growth of firms as 
financial tools and fiscal policies of the local governments examined by this 
study. Financial crisis and firm size dummies indicate the economic shock and 
the effect of large firms on the output growth of firms, respectively. The data 
spanned the period of 1997 to 2009. Sixteen metropolitan regions in Korea 
were included. The final estimated equations on the two-level models are as 
follows:   
 
Random effect model 
Level 1 
0 2
,ln ~ (0, )ij t j ij ijy N         (4.2) 
Level 2 
0 0 0 2~ (0, )oj j j N         
(4.3) 
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where y represents the output of firm i (i = 1… m) in region j (j = 1… n) and in 
time t. x includes labor, capital, each financial resource, and financial crisis 
and firm size dummies.
36
 z represents regional macro variables as local 
government policies. Level 1 and Level 2 imply the firm level and the regional 
level, respectively, in each model. Equation (4.9) includes variance of 
intercept, variance of parameter, covariance between intercept and parameter, 
and residual of firm level as a random effect. The deviations of the output 
growth of firms can be interpreted by these effects, which can be divided into 
the disparity among firms and among regions. 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the output growth model of firms for 16 
                                           
36 Linear variables are grand mean-centered regardless of region. In the alternative random 
intercept-slope model, the set of x variables includes the set of z variables. 
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metropolitan regions. As regards financial resources, the short-term loan 
positively affected the output growth of most firms except those in the North 
Gyoungsang and Jeju regions. However, the effects of long-term loan on the 
output growth of firms were negative except that on firms in the South Jolla 
and Jeju regions. In the South Jolla region, only long-term loans among the 
financial resources positively affected the output growth of firms. In the North 
Jolla region, only short-term loans among the financial resources positively 
affected the output growth of firms. In the review of previous literature, 
Schmidt et al. (1999) stressed that banks persistently hold an important role 
by emphasizing the supply of short-term loans, but Koo (2007) found that the 
profit-oriented management of banks weakens long-term financing and 
investment in small and medium companies in Korea. The parameters of 
estimating short-term and long-term loans show results similar to those of the 
previous studies. Bond positively affected the output growth of firms, and 
paid-in-capital increase had a positive effect only in the Gyounggi region. 
However, previous studies pointed out the inefficient allocation of resources 
of the bank-based financial system because of the financial crisis. Small and 
medium firms were expected to lead the regional economies in the North 
Chungchong, North Jolla, and Jeju regions. The financial crisis affected the 
economy of Gwangju region the most significantly. The effect of each 
financial resource such as the market-based and the bank-based system was 
different per region. The sum of elasticity for each financial sector was low in 
the Daejeon and Jeju regions. Thus, financing among regions was constrained 
by each financial resource. 
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Table 4.5 Estimation of Output Growth Model of Firms for 16 Metropolitan Regions  
Variable 
Seoul Busan Daegu Incheon 
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter 
Intercept 10.737*** 10.688*** 10.511*** 10.457*** 
Log (Labor) 0.898*** 0.949*** 0.965*** 0.860*** 
Log (Capital) 0.102*** 0.051*** 0.035*** 0.140*** 
Firms Size Dummy (Large Firms=1) 0.062*** -0.041*** 0.015*** 0.473*** 
Log (Short-Term loan) 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 
Log (Long-Term loan) -0.003*** -0.022*** -0.039*** -0.034*** 
Log (Bond) 0.020*** 0.037*** 0.059*** 0.011*** 
Log (Paid-in-Capital Increase) 0.002*** -0.005*** -0.022*** -0.002*** 
Financial Crisis Dummy (1997~1999) -0.654*** -0.713*** -0.682*** -0.685*** 
Adj R-Sq 68.98 50.85 63.90 70.72 
Variable 
Gwangju Daejon Ulsan Gyounggi 
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter 
Intercept 10.801*** 10.406*** 10.647*** 10.522*** 
Log (Labor) 0.718*** 0.824*** 0.886*** 0.837*** 
Log (Capital) 0.282*** 0.176*** 0.114*** 0.163*** 
Firms Size Dummy (Large Firms=1) -0.066*** 0.177*** 0.299*** 0.162*** 
Log (Short-Term loan) 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 
Log (Long-Term loan) -0.070*** -0.035*** 0.009*** -0.015*** 
Log (Bond) 0.001*** -0.008*** 0.004*** 0.019*** 
Log (Paid-in-Capital Increase) 0.010*** -0.099*** -0.052*** 0.019*** 
Financial Crisis Dummy (1997~1999) -1.013*** -0.057*** -0.862*** -0.625*** 









Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter 
Intercept 10.227*** 10.488*** 10.514*** 10.661*** 
Log (Labor) 0.883*** 0.896*** 0.893*** 0.921*** 
Log (Capital) 0.117*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.079*** 
Firms Size Dummy (Large Firms=1) -0.088*** -0.157*** 0.433*** -0.215*** 
Log (Short-Term loan) 0.001*** 0.020*** -0.006*** 0.026*** 
Log (Long-Term loan) -0.003*** -0.028*** -0.039*** -0.003*** 
Log (Bond) 0.033*** 0.015*** 0.041*** 0.014*** 
Log (Paid-in-Capital Increase) -0.087*** 0.004*** -0.038*** 0.023*** 
Financial Crisis Dummy (1997~1999) -0.642*** -0.634*** -0.608*** -0.619*** 









Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter 
Intercept 10.560*** 10.594*** 10.613*** 10.682*** 
Log (Labor) 0.873*** 0.856*** 0.942*** 0.750*** 
Log (Capital) 0.127*** 0.144*** 0.058*** 0.250*** 
Firms Size Dummy (Large Firms=1) -0.126*** 0.043*** 0.086*** -0.951*** 
Log (Short-Term loan) -0.015*** -0.011*** 0.023*** -0.158*** 
Log (Long-Term loan) 0.041*** 0.002*** -0.020*** 0.076*** 
Log (Bond) -0.004*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.098*** 
Log (Paid-in-Capital Increase) -0.020*** 0.007*** 0.011*** -1.164*** 
Financial Crisis Dummy (1997~1999) -0.772*** -0.675*** -0.722*** -0.432*a 
Adj R-Sq 65.70 65.88 63.42 48.05 
*, **, and *** meant respectively the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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Each estimated parameter was regressed by regional macro variables such 
as local government credit guarantee, local tax revenue, investment 
expenditures, and non-investment expenditures of each local government. 
Column 2 in Table 4.6 shows that the credit guarantee of the local government 
positively affects the elasticity of each parameter. The effect of credit 
guarantee is the highest on bond issues. However, in column 3, the sign of 
local tax revenue is negative for all parameters. Thus, a low regional tax 
burden can be helpful in financing the output growth of firms. Investment 
expenditures of each local government positively affected the elasticity of 
paid-in-capital increase. The effects of investment expenditures as local 
government policy on the elasticity of labor, capital, short-term loans, long-
term loans, and bond issues were unclear.  
 
Table 4.6 Estimation of Each Parameter in Output Growth Model of Firms 













Intercept 5.882*** 0.798*** -0.643*** 0.658*** 0.187*** 
Labor -3.338*** 0.840*** -0.753*** 0.696*** 0.208*** 
Capital -3.675*** 0.883*** -0.582*** 0.481*** 0.219*** 
Short-Term loan -4.246*** 0.848*** -0.501*** 0.394*** 0.259*** 
Long-Term loan -4.286*** 0.845*** -0.618*** 0.497*** 0.275*** 
Bond -4.128*** 0.853*** -0.616*** 0.524*** 0.239*** 
Paid-in-Capital Increase -5.229*** 0.794*** -0.134*** -0.109*** 0.449*** 
*, **, and *** meant respectively the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
Thus, the credit guarantee of local government and the reduction of 
regional tax burden are important in financing the output growth of firms. The 
present role of credit guarantee of the local government expands from credit 
offering to loans to participation in the direct financing resources, such as 
bond of buying firms or takeover of paid-in-capital increase. Moreover, the 
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investment expenditures of each local government play a more active role 
such as financial support. 
Table 4.7 presents the results of five multi-level statistical models and the 
ordinary least square (OLS) model. The model fitness of the random 
intercept-slope model is the highest among five multi-level statistical models. 
First, the random effect model in column 1 shows that the disparity of growth 
among firms was 2.361, but the regional deviation of output growth of firms 
was 0.051 based on the random effect. Thus, disparities of output growth were 
present among firms and regions. However, in the random intercept model 
(column 2), the disparity of output growth among firms was reduced, whereas 
the regional disparity increases. In fixed effects, the short-term loan in the 
bank-based system and the bond and paid-in-capital increase in market-based 
system efficiently manage the output growth of firms. However, a negative 
effect was observed for the long-term loan from indirect financial sectors. 
This result is similar to the previous estimation results of the output growth 
model for 16 metropolitan regions. The ideal case is that firms will be 
financed by banks for short periods or urgent cases but will raise funds from 
the market for long periods. This method affects the cost and rollover burden 
of long-term loans. This method is also caused by the profit-oriented 
management of banks pointed out in the previous study, which weakened the 
long-term financing for firms in Korea. The effect of bond on the output 
growth of firms was 5.38 times larger than that of paid-in-capital increase. 
Regional macro variables show that local government investment 
expenditures more positively affected the output growth of firms than non-
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investment expenditures. However, the current credit guarantee program of 
the local government is inefficient because it negatively affects the output 
growth of firms. The credit guarantee program of the local government must 
be revised to contribute to the financing and growth of firms. Moreover, the 
tax burden was insignificant. The large firms showed economic growth higher 
by 0.40%. The financial crisis shock decreased the economic growth of firms 
by (-) 0.53%. 
The random slope and the random intercept-slope model in columns 3 and 
4, respectively, imply a regional disparity of financial tools and fiscal policies 
as local government policies. As a result, the random intercept-slope model in 
column 4 shows that the regional deviation of output growth of firms, which 
was recorded at 7.105, increased even more than the random intercept model 
from random effects. The local tax revenue shows a positive effect on the 
regional level for the output growth of firms in the random intercept-slope 
model. Thus, if the local government achieves a higher fiscal self-reliance 
ratio from more local tax revenue, the national loan or deficit finance will 
decrease, which will be helpful to the regional economy. The effect of credit 
guarantee of local government shows a sign at the regional level different 
from that of the fixed effect in the random intercept model. However, the 
effect of investment expenditures was the most significant, whereas the effect 
of credit guarantee of the local government was the least significant. The 
random effects in column 4 show that each regional macro variable was 
activated differently for the output growth of firms at the regional level. In the 
fixed effect, each independent variable shows results similar to those of the 
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random intercept model.  
 





















Intercept 10.311*** 2.105*** 0.320*** 0.115*** 10.524*** 0.057*** 







0.721*** 0.722*** 0.722*** 0.724*** 0.722*** 
Log (Capital) 
 
0.083*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 
Firms Size Dummy  
(Large Firms=1)  






Log (Short-Term loan) 
 
0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
Log (Long-Term loan) 
 
-0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.004*** 
Log (Bond) 
 
0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 
Log (Paid-in-Capital Increase) 
 
0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.001*** 0.007*** 





Financial Crisis Dummy  
(1997~1999)  
-0.530*** -0.285*** -0.239*** -0.662*** -0.302*** 






































Intercept 0.051*** 0.119***  7.105*** 
 
4.636*** 





Log (Credit Guarantee) 
 
 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
Log (Local Tax Revenue) 
 
 0.025*** 0.083*** 
 
0.017*** 
Log (Investment Expenditures) 
 
 0.339*** 0.290*** 
 
0.017*** 
Log  (Non-Investment Expenditures) 
 
 0.054*** 0.014*** 
 
0.006*** 








*, **, and *** meant respectively the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
Using the OLS method, the effect of long-term loan on financial resources 
was insignificant. Paid-in-capital increase was negative even if it was 
insignificant. This unclear result suggests an error or misunderstanding in the 
policy on decision making. In short, the clear regional disparity present in 
financial tools and fiscal policies of local governments in Table 4.7 was 
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compared with the results of estimating each parameter in the output growth 
model in Table 4.6. Thus, the regional economy was activated positively and 
differently at the macro level. Although the credit guarantee of the local 
government is affected reversely at the micro and macro levels, the local 
government credit guarantee program must be revised more efficiently to 
contribute to the financing and the output growth of firms. The local 
government needs to establish a vigorous fiscal policy on economic activities 
and financial support for firms that focus on investment expenditures. The 
relationship between the market-based system and the bank-based system 
must be mutually complementary even though the direct financing market 
significantly affects the output growth of firms more.  
Table 4.8 illustrates how the output growth of firms changes per region 
depending on the financial tools and fiscal policies as local government 
policies using the random intercept-slope model.
37
 The random intercept-
slope model shows that the firms in SMA regions recorded an average of (-) 
0.380 in the output growth change of firms, and the firms in ROK recorded an 
average of 0.088. Thus, the effects of financial tools and fiscal policies were 
higher in the ROK regions than in the SMA regions. For example, among 
SMA regions, Seoul, the capital of Korea, and Gyounggi exhibited negative 
change of (-) 1.669 and (-) 0.094, respectively. Among SMA regions, Incheon 
exhibited a small positive change of 0.624. Among ROK regions, Jeju 
exhibited the highest change rate in the output growth of firms from financial 
tools and fiscal policies. Kangwon, Choungchong, and South Gyoungsang 
                                           
37 The fitness of this model is high among the five multi-level statistical models. 
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regions showed the second highest change in the output growth of firms. 
However, four metropolitan cities
38
 in ROK regions exhibited negative output 
growth change rates from financial tools and fiscal policies as local 
government policies. The previous analysis confirms regional disparity in the 
financial tools and fiscal policies of the local government. Firms in ROK 
regions were inferior in the financial credit assistance of local governments to 
firms in SMA, which could cause them financial constraints. Thus, financial 
tools and fiscal policies are more diversified in ROK regions. Moreover, the 
local government expenditures need to be examined in terms of efficiency and 
increased further. For example, Daejeon and Gwangju metropolitan cities had 
a population size similar to that of Kangwon province, but the former regions 
reported lower local government finance than the latter. Thus, balanced local 
government expenditures are required nationally.   
 
Table 4.8 Changes in the Output Growth of Firms among Regions from 







Seoul -1.669 -1.266 
Incheon 0.624 0.265 
Gyounggi -0.094 0.447 
ROK 
Kangwon 2.668 1.860 
North Chungchong 1.813 1.779 
South Chungchong 1.385 1.692 
North Jolla 0.276 0.075 
South Jolla -1.990 -1.477 
North Gyoungsang 0.792 0.817 
South Gyoungsnag 1.661 1.536 
Daejeon 0.218 0.235 
Daegu -4.180 -3.646 
Ulasn -1.662 -1.454 
Gwangju -4.216 -3.105 
Busan -0.756 -1.349 
Jeju 5.129 3.590 
*, **, and *** meant respectively the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
                                           
38 These regions are Busan, Daegu, Gwangju, and Ulsan metropolitan city (Table 4.8). 
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As regards to current government policies in financial sectors, the regional 
financial policy of the local government must be revised in the direction more 
suitable to the output growth of firms through the participation in the direct 
financial system such as bond issues and paid-in-capital increase. 
 
4.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
This study analyzed the factors of output growth of firms in financial 
sectors considering the role of local government in regional government 
policies. The results of estimating the multi-level statistical models are as 
follows. First, firms in ROK are inferior in financing through the direct 
financial market (market-based financial system). Moreover, firms in ROK 
regions are inferior in the financial credit assistance of local governments to 
firms in SMA, which can cause them financial constraints. Second, the firms 
are financed by banks for short periods or urgent cases but raise funds from 
the market for long periods. The relationship between the market-based 
system and the bank-based system must be mutually complementary even 
though the direct financing market more significantly affects the output 
growth of firms. Third, financial tools and fiscal policies as local government 
policies positively and differently activate the output growth of firms per 
region at the macro level. This result continues to promote the regional 
deviation of output growth of firms. Fourth, the local government should 
establish a vigorous fiscal policy on economic activities and financing 
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assistance for firms. The local government credit guarantee program must also 
be revised more efficiently to contribute to the financing and the output 
growth of firms. For example, the screen system should be improved. Fifth, 
the effects of financial tools and fiscal policies are high in ROK regions. 
Therefore, financial tools and fiscal policies should be more diversified in 
these regions. Lastly, the regional financial policy of the local government 
must be revised in the direction more suitable to the output growth of firms 
through the participation in the direct financial system such as bond issues and 
paid-in-capital increase. This requirement is related to the recent rapidly 
changing financial environments, such as the increasing influence of direct 
financing and the enactment of the Capital Market Integration Act. 
Future studies may consider the year growth effect of financing resources 
because of the time lag between the financing and the investment periods. In 
terms of year growth effect, the overlapping generation model can be used. 
Moreover, regions must be broken down further such as by county level. 
Further division will reflect more minutely the regional deviation of financial 
tools and fiscal policies as local government policies. The regional trade 
among real sectors aside from financial sectors can be represented in the 
model. Thus, the regional economic growth can be determined not only by 
production, consumption, and trade but also by saving and investment through 








Regional development and policy are major issues in regional economics. 
Chapter II analyzed the effect of labor or population mobility between the two 
regions on regional economies. Residing and working in the same region are 
found to be beneficial. Indirect utility is also maximized when the residence 
follows the work site in the mobility. The ratio of or the gap between indirect 
utilities is affected by transportation and mobility costs. The transportation 
cost negatively affects indirect utility. A laborer’s indirect utility decreases in 
his mobility cost. Agglomeration economies improve in the increasing 
population. Finally, the case of residing and working in the same region is 
more beneficial than residing and working in different regions. As a result, for 
the success of Sejong City, the residential and work sites need to be reconciled 
without having to commute to the SMA region. Finally, the key issue is the 
policy of migration to Sejong City for a short period of time, which needs to 
involve subsidies or incentives. Agglomeration economies depend on the 
number of migrants who settle in Sejong City. Consequently, economic 
activities should be relocated in the target region. Numerical simulation 
showed that high transportation and commuting costs induce labor and 
population dispersion to the Choungchong region, including Sejong City, and 
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positively affect the output growth. However, social welfare also decreases. 
Therefore, subsidies and tax policies are needed to achieve labor and 
population dispersion in the Choungchong region, including Sejong City, 
without a decrease in welfare. 
Chapter III examined the economic growth patterns of the less developed 
regions and identifying the reasons why the less developed regions 
continuously show low income growth. The results showed that there were 
regions that remained as less developed for a long time, which can be 
considered as structured. The less developed regions recorded a low average 
regional income levels from 1998 to 2009 and even lower regional income 
growth rates in 2009 against 1998 compared with the national average. The 
less developed regions were mostly concentrated in the Eastern and South-
Western areas of Seoul, Korea. Most of the less developed regions grew less 
during the recovery periods compared with the developed regions. 
Consequently, there was an asymmetric regional income growth structure 
among the less developed regions that significantly hindered the regional 
income growth; specifically, the structural factor caused the low income 
growth among less developed regions. The developed regions were expected 
to be clustered and become richer by means of the neighboring effect. The 
neighboring developed regions pulled most of the regional income growth of 
the less developed regions. The greater the disparity between the neighboring 
developed regions and the less developed regions the more it hindered the 
regional income growth of the latter. Reducing the disparity between the 
neighboring regions and the less developed regions would result in the growth 
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of the regional economies of the latter. Finally, the results on the neighboring 
effects, the effects of industrial structures, and population are very important 
to the present discussion. Moreover, the empirical results of concentration in 
manufacturing sector suggest that the relocation of manufacturing facilities 
among regions may be required. In addition, capital enlargement, 
reinforcement of the manufacturing basis, and a more active role in of 
regional government, including the optimal regional tax burden, were needed 
to facilitate regional income growth in the less developed regions.  
Lastly Chapter IV analyzed the factors of output growth of firms in 
financial sectors considering the role of local government in regional 
government policies. Firstly, firms in ROK are inferior in financing through 
the direct financial market (market-based financial system). Moreover, firms 
in ROK regions are inferior in the financial credit assistance of local 
governments to firms in SMA, which can cause them financial constraints. 
The relationship between the market-based system and the bank-based system 
must be mutually complementary even though the direct financing market 
more significantly affects the output growth of firms. Also, financial tools and 
fiscal policies as local government policies positively and differently activate 
the output growth of firms per region at the macro level. This result continues 
to promote the regional deviation of output growth of firms. Finally, the local 
government should establish a vigorous fiscal policy on economic activities 
and financing assistance for firms. The local government credit guarantee 
program must also be revised more efficiently to contribute to the financing 
and the output growth of firms. Also, financial tools and fiscal policies should 
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be more diversified in ROK regions. Lastly, the regional financial policy of 
the local government must be revised in the direction more suitable to the 
output growth of firms through the participation in the direct financial system 
such as bond issues and paid-in-capital increase.  
 
5.2 Further research 
 
This study approached to the regional development through three essays.  
From first thesis, in the further research, a simple two-region model may need 
to be extended to time-extend model including time constraints, as well as 
transportation and mobility costs. A dynamic model that includes changes in 
commuting or migration patterns between overlapping generations can be 
considered in future research. As an important factor that induces the 
migration between two regions, QOL should also be taken into account in 
future models. 
In the second thesis, a spatial weighted matrix, such as discussing the 
accessibility based on railroad or road network beyond the contiguity, could 
be considered to extend the scope of the analysis. Moreover, the neighboring 
effect could be studied dynamically with the inclusion of a time variable. 
Manufacturing and service sectors could also be classified in a more detailed 
manner because energy, information and communication, and cultural 
industry have become important aspects included in the analysis. Finally, the 
change of the labor structure caused by a rapidly ageing society would be 
covered for the regional income growth. 
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The last thesis may consider the year growth effect of financing resources 
because of the time lag between the financing and the investment periods. In 
terms of year growth effect, the overlapping generation model can be used. 
Also, the regional trade among real sectors aside from financial sectors can be 
represented in the model. Thus, the regional economic growth can be 
determined not only by production, consumption, and trade but also by saving 
and investment through direct and indirect financial markets. In addition, the 
effect of local private finance such as credit association or village level 







Figure I.1 Percentage Change in Real GDP of Maryland  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
Figure I.2 Percentage Change in Real GDP of West Virginia 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
Figure I.3 Percentage Change in Real GDP of Mississippi 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































With regards the factors leading to the poverty trap, first, a minimum 
threshold of capital is needed before modern production processes can be 
started. When k is very low, the marginal productivity of capital tends to be 
very low. Moreover, based on Figure II.1, small increments of k below a 
threshold k
T
 may insignificantly raise production based on Figure II.1. As a 




Figure II.1 Shortage of Capital Stock Threshold 
Source: Sachs (2004) 
 
Second, the savings rate was very low or even negative because of the 
impoverished households who divide their output into consumption and 
saving. Given that particular situation, these people are not capable of 
generating their own savings, rather, they use all (or more than all) of their 
current income for consumption. Therefore, k is very low and the saving trap 
occurs below a threshold k
T
 similar to the shortage of capital stock threshold, 
as shown in Figure II.1. These two cases showed two equilibria and suggest 
the very poor indeed get poorer and are pushed more into extreme poverty by 
the lack of capital accumulation, coupled with population growth and other 
input factors. 
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Lastly Sachs (2004) proposed a third factor that can push an economy into 
a poverty trap – the rapid population growth at low levels of k (shown in 
Figure II.2). Very poor people do not have any savings, and if they do, these 
are in the form of reproducible capital or human capital. On the contrary, 
these people save in the form of progeny. These people have low productivity, 
and as a result, the investment cannot follow the quantity of effective labor 
and the depreciated capital cannot be replaced. Finally, the capital stock 
accumulation does not hold k steady. Consequently, dk / dt become negative 
when k < k
T
. The lack of capital accumulation, coupled with population 
growth and other input factors, push the economy into more extreme poverty 
and continuously low levels of regional economic growth. 
 
Figure II.2 Demographic Trap 









In the less developed regions, the savings rate was the key feature of reality. 
This was assumed to be at 0.329, and the growth rate of population and 
knowledge was set within the range of -0.4% to 2.3%. The depreciation rate 
was assumed to be 4.0%. The capital share in output, α, was set to a 
benchmark value of 0.3 in Non-Seoul Metropolitan Regions (Seo, 2008). The 
other high steady state was calibrated for the savings rate that was twice as 
high as calculated, but with no other changes in any of the parameters of the 
neoclassical growth model. It was presumed that the point at which savings 
rate jumped to the higher rate occurred to the left of what was shown as the 
poverty trap equilibrium. Finally, the capital share in the output and the 





































2 2 Kyounggi  Sihung 23 46 
Seoul  Seochogu 15 17 Kyounggi  Gunpo 54 63 
Seoul  Kangnamgu 3 8 Kyounggi  Yongin 7 15 




24 41 Kyounggi  Ansung 36 70 
Busan Kangseogu 27 74 Kyounggi  Kimpo 38 68 
Daegu Dalseogu 31 34 Kyounggi  Hwasung 5 30 
Incheon Joonggu 65 77 Kyounggi Gwangju 48 71 
Incheon  Donggu 49 62 Kyounggi  Yangju 50 65 
Incheon  Namdonggu 28 32 Kyounggi  Pocheon 64 83 
Incheon  Seogu 34 37 
South 
Chungcheong 
Cheonan 18 47 
Daejeun Yoosung 51 90 
South 
Chungcheong  
Asan 12 53 
Kyounggi Sungnam 37 61 
South 
Chungcheong  
Seosan 42 86 
Kyounggi  Anyang 41 51 North Jeonla Gunsan 66 66 
Kyounggi  Bucheon 33 36 
North 
Kyoungsang 







Gumi 11 9 
Kyounggi  Pyoungtaek 6 48 
South 
Kyoungsang 
Kimhae 46 52 
Kyounggi  Ansan 13 20 
South 
Kyoungsang 























Busan Joonggu 210 182 
South 
Chungcheong 
Taean 206 201 
Busan  Seogu 152 127 North Jeonla Jeonju 109 67 
Busan  Donggu 180 138 North Jeonla Jeongeub 139 125 
Busan Jingu 130 85 North Jeonla Namwon 170 173 
Busan  Dongraegu 168 110 North Jeonla Kimje 126 126 
Busan Namgu 114 112 North Jeonla Muju 223 215 




120 101 North Jeonla Sunchang 205 194 
Busan Gumjunggu 97 73 North Jeonla Buan 191 195 
Busan Yeonjegu 138 118 South Jeonla Mokpo 144 116 
Busan Suyounggu 176 154 South Jeonla Suncheon 118 123 
Busan Gijang 88 78 South Jeonla Naju 115 103 
Daegu Joonggu 171 137 South Jeonla Damyang 154 122 
Daegu  Donggu 116 82 South Jeonla Goksung 129 98 
Daegu  Namgu 220 199 South Jeonla Gurae 221 212 
Daegu  Susunggu 167 124 South Jeonla Goheung 187 178 
Incheon Kyeoyangu 101 79 South Jeonla Bosung 185 187 
Incheon Kanghwa 164 163 South Jeonla Hwasun 155 151 
Gwangju Donggu 209 177 South Jeonla Jangheung 203 202 
Gwangju Namgu 198 157 South Jeonla Kangjin 201 188 
Daejeon Donggu 163 115 South Jeonla Haenam 143 131 
Daejeon Joonggu 161 109 South Jeonla Muan 174 156 








Kangwon Wonju 106 97 South Jeonla Jangsung 121 113 
Kangwon Kangleong 142 119 South Jeonla Wando 199 152 
Kangwon Donghae 146 111 South Jeonla Jindo 214 211 
Kangwon Sokcho 217 204 South Jeonla Shinan 192 191 
Kangwon Samchuk 132 130 
North 
Kyoungsang 
Andong 158 153 
Kangwon Hongcheon 131 129 
North 
Kyoungsang 










Kangwon Youngweol 157 128 
North 
Kyoungsang 










Kangwon Jeongsun 178 174 
North 
Kyoungsang 
Chilgok 94 75 
Kangwon Cheolwon 200 190 
North 
Kyoungsang 
Uljin 186 179 
Kangwon Yanggu 219 218 
South 
Kyoungsang 












Kangwon Inje 215 210 
South 
Kyoungsang 
Jinhae 100 87 
Kangwon Gosung 216 203 
South 
Kyoungsang 
Milyang 134 134 








Chungju 117 117 
South 
Kyoungsang 
Namhae 218 214 
North 
Chungcheong  
Okcheon 159 150 
South 
Kyoungsang 













Goesan 175 175 
South 
Kyoungsang 
Hapchun 196 161 
North 
Chungcheong  
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지역경제 성장에 관한 에세이 
 
이 창 근 
   농경제사회학부 지역정보전공 
서울대학교 대학원 
 
본 논문은 지역경제성장에 관한 세 가지 에세이를 제시하였다. 
2장은 두 지역모형을 통해 두 지역간 인구와 노동의 이동이 지역 
경제에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 특히 거주지와 직장이 일치될 때 
효용이 증가되는 것으로 나타났다. 궁극적으로 세종시에서 수도권 
지역으로의 통근 없이, 이주를 통해 세종시에 조기 정착하기 
위해서는 보조금이나 인센티브 정책이 적극적으로 필요하였다. 
시뮬레이션 결과에서는 물류비나 통행비의 증가가 수도권과 충청 
지역간 인구분산을 촉진시키는 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 충청 지역의 
생산은 증가하나 사회후생은 감소하였다. 결과적으로 물류비나 
통행비의 감소는 수도권 지역으로의 인구 집중을 초래하였다. 
궁극적으로 수도권에서 충청권으로의 인구분산을 위해서는 
물류비나 통행비의 증가보다도 보조금 또는 감세정책을 보다 
적극적으로 수립할 필요가 있을 것이다. 
3장은 저성장 지역의 성장패턴과 성장요인을 불균형 성장모형을 
통해 분석하였다. 저성장 지역은 우리나라의 강원, 호남 지역에 
집중되어 있었으며, 외환위기 이후 저성장 패턴이 고착화되었다. 
특히 저성장 지역은 경기회복기에 국내 평균 성장률보다 낮은 
성장률을 보였다. 주변지역의 경제성장 효과와 관련하여 주변에 
고성장 지역이 분포할 때 저성장 지역은 보다 더 성장하는 것으로 
나타났다. 저성장 지역의 성장을 위해서는 자본축적, 제조업 기반 
강화, 지방정부의 감세 또는 재정확대 정책 등이 필요한 것으로 
나타났다. 또한, 국내에서 추진되고 있는 행정구역 통합과 관련하여 
저성장 지역의 성장을 견인하기 위해서는 주변지역 도시 간의 
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통합이 중요한 고려사항으로 대두되었다. 
4장은 지방 정부의 금융지원과 재정정책의 효과를 고려하여 금융 
수단별로 기업 성장에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 이를 위해 기업 
통계 자료와 지방 정부의 거시 지표를 사용하여 다중 통계 모형을 
적용하였다. 분석 결과, 비수도권 지역의 기업들은 채권발행이나 
유상증자와 같은 직접금융 시장에서의 자금조달에 제약이 있었다. 
또한, 지방 정부의 금융지원에 있어서도 수도권 지역의 기업들보다 
불리한 환경에 처해 있었다. 하지만, 지방 정부의 금융지원과 
재정정책의 효과는 비수도권 지역의 기업성장에 보다 긍정적으로 
작용하였다. 궁극적으로 지방 정부의 금융지원과 재정정책은 기업 
성장의 지역별 격차를 초래하지만, 현행 간접금융 시장에서의 지방 
정부의 신용보증과 같은 금융지원 수단은 채권매입 또는 유상증자 
참여 등과 같은 직접금융 수단으로까지 확대될 필요가 있었으며, 
비수도권 지역의 경우 보다 적극적인 재정정책이 필요하였다.  
 
 
주요어 : 두지역모형, 이주·통근, 집적경제, 물류비·통행비, 집중·
분산, 불균형 성장모형, 주변효과, 저성장, 자본축적, 지역통
합, 금융지원, 재정정책, 다중 통계 모형, 직접·간접금융 
  
 






지금까지의 성과물들이 나올 수 있게 아낌없이 지도해주시고 
무엇을 해야 하는지를 행동으로 늘 보여 주신 김의준 교수님께 
진심으로 감사드립니다. 때로는 교수님의 열정에 뒤따라가지 못할 
때도 있었지만, 교수님의 그 열정 덕분에 하루하루 저 자신이 
성장하고 있는 것을 느낄 때면, 저 스스로의 만족감으로 마음이 
충만했었습니다. 하지만, 이제 연구실을 나서면서 걱정이 먼저 
앞섭니다. 늘 해주시던 말씀이 오늘따라 더욱 선명하게 생각납니다. 
“평생 먹고 살 거리를 찾아야 한다.” 
“왜 그런가, 왜 그런 결과가 나왔는가” 
“이론, 적용, 정책적 함의! 기여도가 무엇인가”… 
늘 고민하시고 뭔가를 찾으시는 교수님의 모습을 보면서 느꼈던 
많은 것들, 소중히 간직하고 있겠습니다. 그리고, 늘 부끄럽지 
않은 제자가 되도록 노력하겠습니다. 감사하다는, 이 이상의 말이 
떠오르지가 않습니다. 교수님! 감사합니다. 
 
유학생보다 못할 거 없다며 국내박사를 키우시겠다는 열정으로 
대학원생들을 지도해 주셨고 논문심사위원장을 맡아주셨던 이성우 
교수님, 늘 학생들과 가까이서 스스럼 없이 대해주셨고 논문 심사 
때에도 사소한 것 하나라도 코멘트해주고자 하셨던 김홍석 교수님, 
논문심사 때 아낌없는 조언과 향후 연구과제를 함께 제시해 주셨던 
김호연 교수님, 그리고 멀리 일본에서 바쁘신 일정에도 불구하고 
논문심사를 위해 기꺼이 수고해 주시고 영어단어 선택 하나하나 




지나온 연구실 생활 기간, 함께 생활했던 동기, 후배님들 모두 
감사합니다. 특히, 논문심사 기간 동안 궂은일 고생해준, 영현, 
은진, 제원, 형근 고맙습니다. 함께 연구실 생활을 했었던, 나보다 
먼저 연구실을 떠나 유학에서 직장에서 자신의 일에 최선을 다하는 
아영, 가영, 상헌, 석, 유진에게도 이제야 감사의 말을 전합니다. 
그리고 명섭, 재연도 빨리 논문 마무리 잘 하길 바랍니다.  
 
늘 함께 가까이서 묵묵히 기다려준 나의 아내 숙현아 고맙다. 
지금의 결실이 사랑하는 아내가 곁에 있었기에 가능했음을 잊지 
않고 이제 잘 할께! 고마워! 정선, 정현, 정민, 건강하게 잘 
자라줘 고맙고 늘 힘이 되어 줘서 고마워! 사랑하는 가족들에게 
다시 한번 고마움을 전합니다.  
 
자식 잘 되기만을 바라시는 어머니께도 인사 드립니다. 어느덧 한 
가정의 가장이 되어버린 아들이지만, 어머니께는 과거에도 
그랬듯이 앞으로도 늘 걱정하는 자식일 뿐입니다. 낳아 주셨기에 
지금의 제가 있고 길러 주셨기에 지금의 제가 있습니다. 
감사드립니다. 
 
지금의 마침은 새로운 시작임을 명심하고 더욱 더 정진하겠습니다. 
 
 ‘참으로 먼 길을 돌고 돌아온 느낌이다.  
하지만, 이제 끝마침은 새로운 시작이다. 
제 2막의 시작이다…’                             
 
2012년 8월 
이창근 드림 
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